Authentication of Smartphone Users Using Behavioral Biometrics by Alzubaidi, Abdulaziz & Kalita, Jugal
1Authentication of Smartphone Users Using
Behavioral Biometrics
Abdulaziz Alzubaidi and Jugal Kalita
Abstract—Smartphones and tablets have become ubiquitous
in our daily lives. Smartphones, in particular, have become
more than personal assistants. These devices have provided new
avenues for consumers to play, work and socialize whenever and
wherever they want. Smartphones are small in size; so they are
easy to handle and to stow and carry in users’ pockets or purses.
However, mobile devices are also susceptible to various problems.
One of the greatest concerns is the possibility of breach in security
and privacy if the device is seized by an outside party. It is
possible that threats can come from friends as well as strangers.
Due to the size of smart devices, they can be easily lost and
may expose details of users’ private lives. In addition, this might
enable pervasive observation or imitation of one’s movements
and activities, such as sending messages to contacts, accessing
private communication, shopping with a credit card, and relaying
information about where one has been. This paper highlights the
potential risks that occur when smartphones are stolen or seized,
discusses the concept of continuous authentication, and analyzes
current approaches and mechanisms of behavioral biometrics
with respect to methodology, associated datasets and evaluation
approaches.
Index Terms—Authentication, Continuous Authentication,
Smartphone, User Behavior, Biometrics, Progressive Authenti-
cation, Implicit Authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the last few years, the world has witnessed thebeginning of a revolution taking shape in the field of
technology. One of the greatest innovations in technology is
the smartphone device. Smartphone devices are characterized
by expedient features, such as sophisticated operating systems
that can allow users to browse the Internet; to listen, watch,
and record video streams; and to navigate, using GPS. These
devices also have large internal storage that enables users
to store gigabytes of valuable information, such as personal
photos, contact details, call histories and private messages.
Rapid progress in mobile technology has led to a significant
shift in large numbers of consumers using smartphone devices
instead of personal computers. Market research finds that
the number of smartphones sold has surpassed the number
of laptops sold worldwide [1]. The tremendous increase in
the number of consumers who are buying smartphones has
pushed these devices to the top of the market, and they
now lead all other electronic devices in terms of sales.
According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), the
total number of shipments in the second quarter of 2015
reached 337.2 million smartphones worldwide, an increase
of 11.6% compared to the same quarter in 2014 [2]. The
second quarter in 2015 has the second highest quarterly total
on record. The number of smartphones is shipped predicted
to rise to 1,928.4 million in 2019 [3].
As much as these devices have gained in popularity and
enhanced users’ productivity and consumption of entertain-
ment, the security of these devices continues to be a major
concern for manufacturers and users alike. This paper focuses
on current methods for user authentication on smartphone
devices.
Motivation
In this paper, we plan to comprehensively review the state-
of-the-art in smartphone authentication focusing on seven
types of behavioral biometrics, which are handwaving, gait,
touchscreen, keystroke, voice, signature and general profiling.
We summarize existing studies which propose significant
solutions for smartphone authentication by discussing the
following points:
• the amount of the data the authors use,
• the types of classifiers the authors choose, and
• the results the authors obtain.
Our discussions are extensive and we follow by outlining
lessons learned and a list of open problems so that new
researchers can get started quickly and avoid pitfalls in their
work. Obviously, we focus on potential solutions that can be
installed on the smartphone platform.
Why this survey
Research on authentication of smartphone users has seen
concentrated work during the last few years, many based on
behavioral biometrics, looking at user behavior concerning
the use of keystrokes and touchscreens, and the individual
characteristics of handwaving and gait. With many recent
studies in the fields, there is need for a survey of techniques
that have been published. Compared to recent published
surveys such as [4], [5], [6] and [7] on the authentication of
smartphone users based on behavioral biometrics, our survey
differs in the following ways.
• Unlike Meng et al. [7], we extensively cover seven be-
havioral biometrics in terms of methodology, associated
datasets and evaluation approaches. This survey offers a
good background for any researcher who is interested in
this field.
• We investigate the awarenesses of security needs that
users express based on surveys. Having a good under-
standing of users’ perceived and real needs and practices
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2is important so that researchers are well- informed about
what approaches will be accepted by users and what will
be ignored.
Table I shows the comparison between our survey and the
most current surveys in this field.
Contribution and Summary
The scope of this survey is continuous authentication for
smartphones platforms. Our contributions in this paper are as
follows.
• We discuss the development of several behavior biometric
approaches that aim to provide continuous authentication
for smartphone devices.
• We characterize each behavioral biometric, outline the
algorithms used for recognition and present obtaining
results obtained using various techniques for comparison.
• We present a summary of these studies and introduce
open problems and future work in continuous
authentication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses possible threats that could impact upon security
and privacy for smartphone consumers and outlines character-
istics of authentication solutions. Section III introduces basic
concepts that are related to the research topic, i.e., biometrics,
authentication, and smartphone sensors. Section III-D outlines
evaluation metrics used in most approaches. Types of behav-
ioral biometrics used in continuous authentication, collection
data, classifiers used and results are discussed in Section IV.
Lessons learned and open problems are presented in Section
V.
II. PROBLEM & SOLUTION CHARACTERISTICS
In this section, we introduce the problem we focus on and
general characteristics of solutions proposed by researchers in
this field.
A. Problem
Smartphones provide substantial personal benefits for users
every day. Many people have come to rely on smartphones
for many common, personal and work-related communication
tasks. Most users tend to store their passwords and private
information on smartphones to efficiently perform these
operations in a hassle-free manner. Consequently, potential
threats to the accounts of owners have increased tremendously.
With the vast popularity of smartphones, privacy and
security issues have become paramount. Due to the size of
smartphones, they are quite prone to potentially being lost,
stolen, or accessed easily by non-owners. Once an intruder
has physical access to a device, he/she may be able to
impersonate the original owner of the device for monetary
or non-monetary gains and mischiefs; thus, smartphones
are much more susceptible to theft than desktops [16].
Attackers are likely to access Online Social Networks
(OSNs), financial application and other applications on stolen
devices. According to 1 [17], the total number of lost or
stolen devices in the USA increased from 1.6 million in
2012 to 3.1 million in 2013. Breitinger and Nickel’s survey
[18] of 548 subjects shows that only 13% of owners tends
to use PIN or visual codes, which means that information
contained in the smartphones of at least 87% of the owners
is in danger once these devices are lost or stolen. 74% of
the participants justify this by saying that they want quick
access to their devices or that they do not think about security.
As a result, protecting the security and privacy of smart-
phone users against unauthorized access is very important and
has become a crucial area of research. Researchers from both
academia and industry have proposed mechanisms to ensure
security and privacy of sensitive information. Each one of
these mechanisms has strengths as well as drawbacks. Some
of the weaknesses of the current security mechanisms are that
they are easy to evade, weak against shoulder surfing and other
attacks and cumbersome to use [19]. To illustrate, a locking
mechanism (e.g., PIN, biometric or secret gesture) supposedly
thwarts most potential threats. But, according to Li et al. [20]
more than 30% of mobile phone users do not even use a
PIN on their phones. In addition, users’ continuous and casual
interaction with these devices can make breaching these PINs
easier. A smart intruder can, with some diligence, monitor and
measure users’ behaviors over a period of time to break the
authentication and steal passwords.
B. SOLUTION CHARACTERISTICS
Unfortunately, most widely-used authentication techniques
for mobile devices are vulnerable, including PINs and patterns
as shown in Fig.1. Indeed, these authentication methods fail to
detect and identify an intruder once he or she has passed the
point of entry. These methods are also deficient in dealing with
various non-conventional attacks such as smudge attack [21],
which picks up oils from users’ skin to detect patterns or PINs,
or a make conventional one such as the shoulder surfing attack,
which uses direct observation techniques like glancing over the
shoulder of a user to gain information [19]. So, what is the
most viable solution to these security problems? An obvious
solution is to perform entry-point authentication as usual, but
go beyond it by performing authentication constantly as a user
uses the device. Currently, there are two ways to perform
continuous authentication: using physiological and behavioral
biometrics. Physiological biometric authentication relies on
user’s static physical attributes such as fingerprints, facial
features or retina images, whereas behavioral biometric au-
thentication adapts to identify features of user’s behavior that
do not vary over a period of time during daily activities such
as typing motions, photo manipulations and hand motions.
A viable authentication solution should be continuous and
be able to implicitly confirm the correct identity of the user.
The purpose of such an approach is to monitor interactions
between a user and the device to decide if the current user
1http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-
rose-to-3-1-million-last-year/index.htm
3Table I: Comparison with Other surveys, where X: cover the topic, x: does not cover the topic.
Study Behavioral Biometric
Behavioral Profiling Gait Handwaving Keystroke Signature Touchscreen Voice User view
Crawford [8], 2010 x x x X x x x x
Duta [9], 2009 x x x x x x x x
Yampolskiy and Govindaraju
[10], 2008
X x x x x x x x
Zhang and Gao [11], 2009 x x x x x x x x
Ashbourn [4], 2014 x x x X X x X x
Long [12], 2007 x x x x x x X x
Jain [5], 2014 x X x X X x X x
Gooda [6], 2014 x x x x x x X x
Rogowski et al.’s [13], 2013 x X x X x X X x
Meng et al. [7], 2015 X X x X X X X x
Zada Khan et al. [14], 2013 x x x x x x x x
Hoseini-Tabatabaei et al. [15],
2013
x x x x x x x x
Our Survey, 2015 X X X X X X X X
Figure 1: Examples of Smartphone Entry Authentication, Left:
Entering a Passcode, Right: Drawing a Pattern
actually owns the device or if the device has been lost or
stolen and used improperly. As researchers deliberate among
current authentication options, we must consider how we can
implement a solution that is fast, convenient and easy to use. A
viable solution must be able to resolve existing issues, such as
security attacks (e.g. smudge attacks [21] and shoulder surfing
attacks [19]), overcome evasions, and also be practical. The
method must also be able to perform passive and continuous
validation to create tighter security.
III. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS
Methods that work to enhance security and privacy need
to pay particular attention to authentication. This section
introduces concepts that are necessary to discuss methods of
information security, in particular authentication.
A. Authentication
Authentication is the process used to validate the true user
of a system. Authentication, in the context of security, takes
into account three primary strategies [22].
Figure 2: Authentication Strategies for Interaction between
Users and Smart devices
1) Knowledge-based, which uses something unique to an
individual: This type of entity could be a password,
answer to a security question, or an ID number that a
user must know.
2) Possession for object-based, which uses something one
possesses in a physical sense: The prevalent examples
of this type are a security token, an ID card or another
trusted device.
3) Biometric, which denotes a physical or behavioral
characteristic: This can be represented by one or more
physical or behavioral attributes. Common examples
are fingerprints and keystroke dynamic models of the
owner of the device.
Figure. 2 illustrates these strategies that aim to improve
authentication between users and smartphones.
Authentication can be active or passive. Active
Authentication requires dealing with a device and inputting
4one or more pieces of valid information or answers to
questions. Because most individuals use many applications
or services, this kind of authentication can become tedious
and frustrating; if required by individual applications. As
a result, many individuals prefer to use their applications
with fewer security impediments each time they decide to
access their devices [23]. Current smartphones are based on
entry-point authentication, which can be either a Personal
Index Number (PIN) or a secret pattern. To use PIN, a user
is usually required to pick 4 digits for validation. The user
has to input this code correctly otherwise, he/she cannot pass
the entry-point to his/her device. Another current method is
the use of a secret gesture. A secret gesture is defined by
moving a finger over the screen to create a certain pattern.
This pattern can be used as authentication to allow the user
to enter the device.
Continuous authentication, also known implicit, passive
or progressive authentication, aims to offer another way to
prevent unauthorized accesses of smartphones [24]. This
method works passively in the background of the device to
make a decision. It is divided into two phases. First, the
user accesses his/her device as usual, but the system records
appropriate features as the user goes about his/her business.
In the case of touchscreen analysis, the recorded features
may include finger movement, speed, X and Y coordinates
of fingers and the pressure applied at sampled time points.
After observing the user behavior for a period of time, the
system learns characteristics of behavior data by performing
statistical analysis or using machine learning. Second, at a
later time after the user logs in to his/her device by using for
example, a PIN, the system continuously compares current
user behavior with the learned user model or computed
statistical profile to make an authentication decision [20].
Any proposed approach based on continuous authentication
should include three features: It should be continuous,
should not intrude on normal user behavior and should be
light-weight. In other words, the system should allow a
legitimate user to use the device without interrupting him/her,
e.g., by asking for authentication information such as a PIN
each time he/she wants to access the device. In addition,
the authentication approach should use low computational
resources [20].
B. Biometric
A biometric characterizes unique physical or behavioral
features of an individual. A biometric scheme aims to detect
and correctly identify the user [22]. The US National Science
and Technology Council’s Subcommittee (NSTC) on Bio-
metrics defines two categories of biometrics: behavioral and
physiological [25]. Physiological security detects the physical
make-up of a person and uses resources such as retina or iris
scans, fingerprints and face recognition. Behavioral biometrics
are based on a user’s behavior and includes analysis of
information like the shape and flow of one’s handwriting,
timing of keystrokes, unique patterns inherent in one’s gait,
speech and usage of styluses, and other features of one’s
general behavior [26]. The use of biometrics, generally, is
divided into two groups based on the type of application:
identification and authentication [26]. Fig. 3 outlines the two
types of biometrics and examples of each type. Once we
combine more than one primary type of authentication, we
may be able to develop stronger security systems [22].
Figure 3: Approaches to Authenticate Users
C. Behavior Biometric
In this paper, we focus on comprehensively summarizing
the state-of-the-art in improving a smartphone’s security based
on continuous authentication using behavioral biometrics. Be-
havioral biometrics, as defined in III-B, use behavioral traits
of a subject like how one touches screen, walks, talks, signs
a signature, and types to identify a subject. Each subject
is expected to differ from all others when analyzed using
one or more of these features. In the following sections, we
discuss in depth four types: keystroke, touchscreen behavior,
gait and handwaving, and also introduce other types such
as voice, signature and profiling. A powerful argument for
behavioral biometrics is that it can assist in continuous and
passive authentication without requiring additional hardware.
As a result, behavioral authentication is likely to be cheaper
than using physiological biometrics. In the following sections,
we will discuss several examples of behavioral biometrics.
These are based on touchscreen behavior, gait, keystroke,
handwaving, voice, profiling and signature.
D. Evaluation Metrics
Various metrics have been used for evaluating each of
the proposed mobile authentication systems. For example, to
assess the performance of a biometric system, we need to
5understand two error rates, False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and
False Rejection Rate (FRR). Table II contains several metrics
that have been used to assess implemented approaches. As an
example, FAR is defined as the percentage of impersonators
who were incorrectly identified by security systems as
genuine users [26].
The purpose of evaluating an authentication system should
include the following objectives: providing a trade-off between
strong protection and appropriateness of the authentication
process, achieving reasonable accuracy in estimating the level
of user authenticity, and providing for acceptable execution
time and power consumption, i.e., reducing authentication
overhead on smartphone devices.
E. Smartphone Sensors
Most modern smartphones have built-in sensors which
can measure motion and environmental and positional
environment the devices are subject to. They provide several
facilities such as providing accurate and precise raw data,
observing the position in three dimensions, and measuring any
possible changes in the surrounding environment sufficiently
close to the device [27]. The raw measurements may be
aggregated by programs or applications to recognize aspects
of how people walk, drive, sit up or talk. Many studies in
different fields in physiological and behavioral biometrics
are based on different sensors to record and extract user’s
features like the orientation of the device, the pressure on the
touchscreen, the pattern of holding the device and the speed
of movement.
In general, smartphones these days include Android,
Apple and Windows platforms and come with three types
of sensors, which are Position sensors, Motion sensors and
Environmental sensors [27], [28], [29].
Position sensors are employed to find the physical position
of a device. This group includes several sensors including
orientation sensors and magnetometers. The magnetometer
is used to measure the strength and the direction of earth’s
magnetic fields, which are expressed in tesla. It can be used
as a compass, which can be used to find directions in a map.
Accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers consistently
return three-dimensional values, which are X or -X, Y or -Y
and Z or -Z [27] [30].
Motion sensors measure acceleration and rotational forces
along three axes. Examples of such sensors are accelerome-
ters, gravity sensors, gyroscopes and rotational vector sensors
[13]. An accelerometer can measure any movement of the
phone including fall of the owner when holding the phone
or free fall of the phone. A gyroscope detects the current
orientation of the device and any possible spin or rotational
change. Accelerometers and gyroscopes always return three-
dimensional values [13]. The orientation of the smartphone
can be computed from the angular velocity detected by the
gyroscope, which is expressed on 3 axes
S(t) =
−→
Sx +
−→
Sy +
−→
Sz (1)
where S(t) denotes the angular velocity, and
−→
Sx,
−→
Sy , and
−→
Sz
refer to the vectors of angular velocity around X, Y, and Z
axes [30].
Environmental sensors measure parameters of the
environment. Tools in this category of sensors include
barometers, photometers and thermometers [27]
Besides these sensors, smartphones also include other
sensors such as microphones, cameras, touchscreens, Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), and compasses.
IV. APPROACHES TO AUTHENTICATION
This section discusses current research on reinforcing inter-
actions between users and smart devices so that authentication
becomes seamless. Studies show that the security and privacy
of smartphones and smart devices can be implemented better
by using implicit or continuous authentication. Continuous
or implicit authentication can potentially offer a stronger
line of defense and implement passive security with non-
intrusive measures. Such approaches analyze interactions of
users with devices and build approximate models of situations
when legal users are the ones using the devices. A con-
tinuous authentication strategy can strike a balance between
passive authentication and entry-point authentication based on
the examination of successful logins. In certain situations,
a security method may even be able to substitute active
authentication with continuous authentication. This section
discusses several studies that aim to enhance security based on
continuous authentication. These studies use different methods
like environment authentication, typing and touchscreen-based
authentication, authentication based on user activities and
authentication based on gait. Fig. 3 outlines these approaches.
A. Handwaving Based Authentication
Identifying users based on wave gesture has gained attention
recently. Hand-waving behavior is the waving pattern of a
person. In other words, it can be used to distinguish users
because different individual, while interacting with the phone
or not, the movement of hand holding the phone is difficult
for different people wave differently. For example, many
people use their hands to wave in a gentle way while others
wave drastically when an individual waves while holding
a smartphone. Several features can be used to distinguish
among users. These include speed, frequency, waving range
and the wrist twisting.
1) Wave-to-Access: Shrestha et al. [31] introduced an
approach called Wave-to-Access based on waving gestures to
prevent malware attack on smartphones. This approach uses a
lightweight ambient light sensor that is built in smartphones,
to analyze phone dialing behavior. The authorized user has to
6Table II: Common Metrics use for Evaluation of Mobile Authentication
Concept Acronym Definition
False Acceptance Rate FAR Proportion of times person are authenticated as rightful owners when they are actually attackers
False Rejection Rate FRR Proportion of times the rightful owner is rejected as intruder
True Positive Rate TPR Proportion of times when the approach correctly identifies the owner
False Positive Rate FPR The likelihood of falsely rejecting the invalid hypothesis for a certain test.
True Negative Rate TNR Also known as (Specificity) TNR=TN/(FP+TN)
Receiver Operating Character-
istic Curve
ROC Graphical plot to represent performance based on TRR and FPR
Area Under the Curve AUC Area under the ROC which is between 0 and 1
Equal Error Rate EER Rate at which both acceptance and rejection errors are closest to zero
Failure to Capture Rate FCR Probability that the system fails to detect a biometric input when presented correctly
False Match Rate FMR Likelihood of the system falsely matches input to a non-matching value
False Non-Match Rate FNMR Likelihood of a failure to examine any match between input value and target template
Half Total Error Rate HTER (FMR + FNMR) /2
Total Error Rate TER sum of FAR and FRR
Rectilinear Distance L1 distance d1(a, b) =
∑n
i=1 | ai− bi |
Euclidean distance L2 distance d (a,b) =
√
(a− b).(a− b)
Normalized Cross Correlation NCC
〈
A
||A|| ,
B
||B||
〉
wave his/her hand in front of the phone order to make a call.
The authors implemented an application on Motorola Droid
X2 using Android OS. The authors recruited 20 subjects,
and each subject had to initially perform hand waving 10
times to unlock the device and make phone calls. The
authors evaluated this experiment in terms of FNR and the
average of FNR obtained was 9.5%. The second experiment
calculated FPR when devices were used as several activities
are performed concurrently. The authors simulated activities
such as walking while phone is inside a backpack, walking
and reading a text message, walking and keeping the phone
inside the pocket, going upstairs/downstairs, placing the
phone in front of the TV while watching movies and playing
a game on one’s own phone. The best FPR achieved in each
case was between 0.08%-1.15%.
2) OpenSesame: Yang et al. [32] implemented an
approach, called OpenSesame, that employs users’ waving
patterns for locking/unlocking purposes. The authors asked
200 subjects to participate in this study. 389,373 raw tuples
are captured with an average 1,947 tuples per user. Each user
has to shake his/her smartphone for approximately 10 seconds
for four times. There were two modes, normal and fast. In
the normal mode, a user’s traces consisted of 100 samples
at 200 ms intervals, while in the fast mode, the user’s traces
consisted of 100 samples with the accelerometer sampling
every 10-20 ms. The authors generated two features,
which were window size and tolerant static period that
represents by acceleration point. The window size w has to be
smaller than the size of the dataset (1,000 acceleration points).
The authors used support vector machines (SVM) [33]
for classifying users into two classes: authorized and
unauthorized. The authors use the open source library,
LIB-SVM [34]. The result of this approach can be presented
from three perspectives: Impact of SVM, Impact of user
motion and usability.
First, the Impact of SVM: In order to balance between time
needed to unlock a device and the accuracy, the window size
should be chosen carefully. The authors used window size
of 50 instead of 5 tuples. They found that the average FNR
is reduced from 20% to 8% and the average FPR decreases
from 42% to 18% because a large number of windows can
help enhance accuracy since more raw tuples are extracted
in a larger window and the user’s handwaving is better
characterized. More training tuples improved the accuracy
as well. The authors found FNR decreases from 15% to 8%
and FPR reduces from 20% to 15% . Second, the Impact
of User Motion: The authors tested the relationship between
the speed of user’s motions and accuracy. Five types of user
motions were considered: stationary, walking slow, walking
fast, running, and being in a vehicle. As the speed grows from
0 to 5 ms, the FNR remains is steady around 11%, with a
standard deviation of 2.0%. This indicates that the motion of
users makes a very limited effect on the approach. The FPR is
actually invariant when the speed of user’s motion increases.
The false positive rate is around 15 percent with a standard
deviation of 2.5%. The FNR has a slight increase, about 7%,
when the speed of user increases from 0 to 5 m/s. This can
be explained because the faster motion increases vibrations
in smartphones leading to more noisy data capture. However,
these motions have very limited effect on the accuracy.
Finally, the authors computed the required time to unlock
the devices. They used HTC One, Xiaomi 2, Nexus 5,
Huawei C8815 and Sony Xperia. The time needed to unlock
devices was 3 seconds, which is higher than using PIN.
This means that this approach does not reduce the time for
unlocking devices. The authors also asked the participants
7to evaluate the approach from different perspectives such as
user-friendliness, security and accessibility. Feedback from
the participants and results obtained showed this approach is
easy to use.
Table III summarizes current studies that use handwaving
biometric.
Table III: Examples of Handwaving
Study Dataset Classifier Used Feature RESULT
FPR FNR
Shrestha
et al.
[31],
2013
20 Linear Ac-
celerome-
ter Sensor
[35]
Timestamps,
Light
intensity
& Duration
for the hand
wave gesture
0.08%-
1.15%
9.5%
Yang
et al.
[32],2015
200 SVM [33]
imple-
mented in
LIB-SVM
[34]
Sampling in-
terval, Accel-
eration along
the x, y & z
15% 8%
B. Keystroke Based Authentication
Validating the nature of typing motion is one of the oldest
methods to validate users. This technique analyzes keystrokes
to determine authorized and unauthorized users. Typing mo-
tion or keystrokes can be used to detect and identify the user
based on his/her manner of typing. Typing motion is divided
into static and dynamic typing. In static typing, participants
are asked to type a short and pre-defined text to compare
motion information, while in dynamic typing, the subject is
not required to type a specific string. He/she is free to type
any text [36]. Figure. 4 shows the architecture of a keystroke
dynamics-based user authentication system.
Figure 4: General Architecture of Keystroke Authentication
System
Table IV outlines the main features used in keystroke based
authentication of users.
Table IV: Keystroke Features
Feature Description
Inter-time The time between releasing a key and pressing of
the next key.
Inter-key The interval between two successive keystrokes.
Hold-time The time difference between pressing and releasing
a single key.
Error-rate How many times backspace is pressed.
Distance The distance, represented in pixels, between two
successively pressed virtual buttons.
Speed Computed from distance between two successively
pressed virtual buttons divided by the sum of inter-
times for each event.
1) A mixture approach based on analysis of keystroke
and handwriting: Trojahn and Ortmeier [37] implemented a
scheme that combines keystroke and handwriting analysis on
smartphone and tablets. They performed two experiments to
collect the data. In the first experiment, the authors asked 18
subjects to type a sentence containing two or more words ten
times. They used the HTC Desire mobile phone with Android
2.2 (the dimension being 119 x 60 x 11.9 mm ) with a virtual
keyboard. In the second experiment, the authors recruited 16
subjects to enter passwords eight times by using the HTC
Desire HD with Android 2.3.5 (the dimension for the device
is 123 x 68 x 11.8 mm). Trojahn and Ortmeier used WEKA
[38] to evaluate their approach. They chose (J48) Decision
Trees [39], Kstar [40], Multi layer Perceptron (MLP) [41],
Radial Basis Function Network (RBFN) [42], BayesNet [43]
and Naive Bayes [44] as classifiers.
In the first experiment, the approach achieved EER of
2.0%, while the second experiment obtained EER of 13.5%.
Decision Trees, Kstar, MLP, RBFN, BayesNet and Naives
Bayes produce FAR of 2.03%,3.49%, 2.52%,1.13%,5.56% and
19.29%; respectively, and FRR of 2.67%,2.21%,3.0%,4.47%,
2.59% and 1.8%); respectively.
2) Typing Authentication and Protection (TAP): Feng et al.
[45] implemented an approach using virtual key typing known
as Typing Authentication and Protection (TAP). TAP divides
an interaction into two phases. The login phase validates the
identity of the user using password and biometric information.
The application runs in the background to authenticate the
user continuously. The second phase is the post-login phase,
which is passive and works to validate the user when typing
inputs.
The authors recruited 40 subjects (25 male and 15
female) and collect the data in a 3-week period. The authors
distributed 10 Android devices to the subjects. In the first
phase (login phase), the subjects entered passwords with
4 characters. 20 different passwords were used to test the
performance of this phase. In the second phase (post-login),
the subject typed sentences between 14 to 53 words. TAP
extracted 40 features from key combinations, 41 features from
key holding times without pressure and 41 pressure features.
To evaluate TAP, the authors used three classifiers, which
8are Decision Trees [39], Random Forest [46] and Bayes Net
[43]. In the first phase, the authors compared all classifiers
in terms of time features, and time and pressure features,
time and pressure features with touch. The performance for
this phase is better when using Bayes Net, achieving FAR
10.4%-16.9% and FRR of 11.0%. In the second phase, when
the authors used input sequences of 60 characters, the Bayes
Net algorithm has the best FRR of 0.27%. However, Random
Forest has the best FAR, which is 8.93%.
3) Keystroke inter keystroke latencies: Buchoux and Clarke
[47] analyzed keystrokes on smartphones using a scheme with
two stages, enrollment and authentication. The authors used
two types of passwords, PIN and a complicated alphanumeric
password. The main goal for this application is to capture key
events and inter-keystroke latencies. The authors recruited
20 subjects for gathering data. Each subject had to type the
password 20 times for the enrollment stage and 10 times
for the authentication stage. The authors used two distance
measures: Euclidean distance [48] and Mahalanobis distance
[49], both with low processing requirements. They also used
a Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron (FF-MLP) neural
network [50] to improve performance for their approach.
Buchoux and Clarke evaluated their approach in terms of
the inter-key feature, and found that the best result for the
approach has FRR of 2.5%.
4) Using speed of finger movement: Kambourakis et al.
[51] introduced a method based on the speed and distance of
finger movement on touchscreen devices. This method aims
to improve analysis of traditional keystroke dynamics. The
authors used four features as input data: hold-time, inter-time,
distance and speed. To collect data, the authors recruited 20
subjects. Each subject has to repeat typing the password and
other several phrases 12 times. The authors consider two
scenarios. These scenarios are widely used in the literature on
legacy keystroke analysis. For the first scenario, the subject
has to type the password 7q56n5ll44, while in the second
scenario, the subject has to type the phrase the quick brown
fox jumped over the lazy ghost twelve times.
The authors selected three classifiers, which are Random
Forest [46], k-NN [52] and MLP [41]. The authors found
that the best results for the first scenario are achieved by
using Random Forest [46] with FRR of 39.4%, FAR 12.5%
and EER 26.0%, while in the second scenario the k-NN
classifier achieves best results, which are FRR of 3.5%, FAR
23.7% and EER 13.6%. The authors also evaluated their
approach in terms of performance: time, CPU and memory.
The CPU consumption is between 91% and 100%, and
memory consumption fluctuates between 67.5% and 80.2%
depending on the methodology, scenario and classification
algorithm used.
5) Keysens Approach: Micro-behavior modeling of soft
keyboard interactions: Draffin et al. [23] introduced a new
passive authentication approach called KeySens, based on
micro-behavior of a user’s interaction with his/her device’s
keyboard. The main goal is to illustrate how some features can
identify users. The authors analyzed the following features:
how users touch keys at specific locations, the movement
of fingers up and down, and the force of the touch and the
area covered by finger. The authors recruited 13 subjects to
participate in their experiment for three weeks and collect
86000 keypresses and 430000 touch data points. The authors
trained a neural network classifier [50] for authentication with
the following features: touch-to-key offsets, sizes of finger
touches, pressure, drag and hold time. KeySens is able to
distinguish between legitimate and impostor users within 5
keypresses 67.7% of the time with FAR of 32.3% and FRR
of only 4.6%. After 15 keypresses, the KeySens is able to
obtain 86% FAR of 14% and a FRR of only 2.2%.
6) Keystroke dynamics-based user authentication using
long and free text strings: Kang and Choa [53] investigated
keystroke dynamics-based user authentication (KDA) when
long and free texts are typed using different input devices.
This is different from most current approaches that focus on
pre-defined and short inputs like passwords. Authentication
using typing of a long piece of free text is affected by three
factors, which are the type of input device, the length of
the text strings and the type of authentication algorithm. To
collect keystroke data, the authors used three input devices,
a traditional PC keyboard, a soft keyboard and a touch
keyboard. Each subject has to type a text with at least 3000
characters for each input device. The authors used one-class
classifiers for their approach and build 12 one classifiers
categorized into three groups. The classifiers used are the
mean and variance equality test (MV test), Kolmogorov–
Smirnov statistic (K–S statistic) [54], Crame´r–von Mises
criterion (C–M criterion) [55], the distance between two
digraph matrices (digraph distance; DD), Parzen window
density estimator (Parzen) [56], k-nearest neighbor detector
(k-NN) [52], and support vector data description (SVDD)
[57]. When the reference and test lengths are the shortest
and equal to 100, the average EERs are the highest for all
four experiments: 24:11%; 30:61%; 35:43%, and 34:48% for
PC keyboard, soft keyboard, touch keyboard typed with one
hand, and touch keyboard typed with two hands, respectively.
The lowest EERs are reported with the longest reference
and test lengths equal to 1000: 5:64%; 14:10%; 12:42%,
and 16:62% for PC keyboard, soft keyboard, touch keyboard
typed with one hand, and touch keyboard typed with two
hands, respectively.
7) Thumb-based keyboards for keystroke dynamic
authentication: Karatzouni and Clarke [58] discussed the
feasibility of keystroke analysis on thumb-based keyboards
extracting two features when using two consecutive keys:
inter-key and hold-time. The authors recruited 50 subjects to
participate in this approach. The subjects were asked to enter
30 messages. Each message is designed to ensure certain
requirements. The authors used a Feed Forward Multilayer
Perceptron Neural Network (FF-MLP) [50] as classifier.
The proposed scheme with inter-keystroke times obtains an
average EER of 12.2%. However, the hold-time characteristic
9is not very useful in the analysis of keystroke interface
because it has a higher EER, which is between 36.8% and
50.02%.
8) Identify users based on digraph features: Zahid et al.
[59] discussed the keystroke dynamics of the users and use 6
different keystroke features to identify users. The features are
Key hold time, Digraph time, Horizontal Digraph, Vertical
Digraph, and Non-adjacent Horizontal and Vertical Digraph.
The authors recruited 25 subjects for this study for 7 days.
The authors used the following classifiers: Naive Bayes [44],
Back Propagation Neural Network (BPNN) [60], Radial Basis
Function Network (RBFN) [42], Kstar [40] and J48 Decision
Tree [39]. The authors used the implementations of these
algorithms in WEKA [38]. Most classifiers produce an FAR of
30-40%, and FRR of most of the classifiers is approximately
30% or higher. These results are not acceptable. Therefore,
the authors used a fuzzy classifier with much better FAR
and FRR of approximately 18.6% and 19.0%, respectively.
However, the accuracy was still low, and as a results, the
authors incorporated a PSO and GA-based optimizer into the
fuzzy classifier [61], and achieve EER lower than 2% after
detection mode and FRR close to 0% after verification of PIN.
9) Using sensors with a virtual software keyboards to
identify users: Gascon et. al [62] developed a software
keyboard application for the Android OS to collect behavioral
biometrics. They implement a keyboard with three sensors,
which are accelerometer, gyroscope and an orientation sensor.
Each one of these sensors measure in three dimensions: X,
Y, and Z. They recruited 315 participants to write pre-defined
short texts. The participants categorized into two groups. The
first group consisted of 303 participants who type the text one
time only. They represented impersonators who can possibly
steal devices if these devices are found unlocked. The second
group consists of 12 authorized users, who were asked to
type the text 10 times so that enough typing motions can be
obtained.
To ensure that only motion data related to typing behavior
is used to analyze a user’s profile, Gascon et al. processed
the sensor signals according to certain time constraints. Users
were observed for T seconds while typing. For example, a
data point is recorded every T seconds while a user is typing
the text. If the user does not type any letter in Tstop seconds,
it assumes that the user is finished typing the text. Once the
user decides to retype text, the new value of T seconds is
added to the previous T . This process collects all motions
that are related to typing.
Gascon et al. used Linear Support Vector Machines [33] to
identify the behavioral fingerprint of each user to distinguish
between authorized users and impersonators. The average
classification performance of classifiers for non-identifiable
users has a considerably high FPR of 35% while reaching
only a TPR of 58%. The value of FPR is too high. This
causes the device to be locked continuously, which means the
user has to validate each time he/she wants to use the device.
This action is incompatible with the purposes of continuous
authentication. Therefore, the FPR must be reduced to
avoid this issue. On the other hand, with regards to clearly
identifiable users, the average classification performance
achieves a TPR of 92%, and FPR of only 1%.
Table V summarizes current studies that use typing motion
approaches.
C. Touchscreen Based Authentication
Smartphone technology has undergone rapid evolution in
the recent past. One main innovation is the touchscreen,
which has become the essential input medium. A touchscreen
is an electronic visual display for inputs and outputs. In 2013,
global touchscreen shipments reached 1.75 billion pieces of,
which approximately 1.28 billion (73%) are for handsets,
which is a 14.2% on-year increase [63]. Analysis of the
nature of touchscreen usage has become one of the most
interesting areas to validate and distinguish among users. In
this section, we discuss several studies that aim to enhance
security and defeat possible attacks.
1) Password Patterns: De Luca et al. [64] introduced an
approach to improve the level of security using password
patterns with an implicit authentication layer. They performed
two studies, a short-term lab study and a long-term study
using higher granularity. In the first study, they explored
simple security procedures (e.g., using a horizontal stroke),
while in the second study, they used password patterns, each
enhanced with passive authentication. These studies used
Android applications to gather information from participant
inputs on touchscreens. De Luca et.al.’s application records
all data available from a touchscreen device: pressure (how
hard the finger presses), size (area of the finger touching the
screen), X and Y coordinates, and time of contact. Evaluation
was based on 26 participants, with 645 valid authentication
attempts and 2790 attacks. The authors used Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) [65] for analysis. This study produced 398
True positives, 231 False positives, 852 True negatives, 92
False negatives with False Rejection Rate of 19%, False
Acceptance Rate of 21% and an average accuracy equals to
77%.
2) Non-Intrusive Approach via Tapping Behavior: Zheng
et al. [66] proposed a mechanism called non-intrusive user
verification. The authors studied behavioral authentication by
analyzing the way a user touches the phone, taking into
account different sensors such as accelerometer, gyroscope
and touch screen sensor. Fig. 5 outlines the architecture of
the system.
The authors recruited 80 subjects to participate in this study.
They used sensors (accelerometer, gyroscope and touchscreen
sensors) to record a user’s behavior. For example, information
such as acceleration, pressure, size of touch area and passage
of time were collected using empirical data on both 4-digit and
8-digit PINs by employing tap behaviors to verify passcodes of
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Table V: Examples of use of Keystroke Biometrics
Study Dataset Classifiers/Metrics Used Feature RESULT
EER FAR FRR CPU con-
sumption
Memory
consump-
tion
Trojahn and
Ortmeier
[37],2013
16 J48 [39], Kstar
[40], MLP [41],
RBFN [42],
Bayes Net [43]
and Naive Bayes
[44]
Diagraph, Pressure,
Finger size
2.0% (1st
exp) 13.5%
(2nd exp)
J48 2.03% J48 2.67% - -
Feng et al.
[45], 2013
40 J48 [39], Random
Forest [46] and
Bayes Net [43]
Holding time, Tactile
pressure, Virtual key
combinations
- Bayes Net
10.4% - 16.9%
(1st phase)
Random
Forest 8.93%
(2nd phase)
, 0.27% (2nd
phase)
- - -
Buchoux and
Clarke [47],
2008
20 Euclidean
distance [48],
Mahalanobis
distance [49],
FF-MLP [50]
- - - 2.5% - -
Kambourakis
et al. [51],
2014
20 Random Forest
[46], k-NN [52]
and MLP [41]
Hold-time, Inter-time,
Distance, Speed
Random
26.0% (1st
sce), k-NN
13.6% (2nd
sce)
- - 91%-100% Fluctuates
between
67.5%
-80.2%
Draffin et al.
[23], 2014
13 Neural network
classifier [50]
Location pressed on
key, Length of press,
Pressure, Size of
touched area, Drift
- 14% 2.2% - -
Kang
and Choa
[53],2015
35 12 one-class
learning
Length of the text,
Start& end key, Time
between two key
presses
PC keyboard
5:64% (length
text 1000)
- - - -
Karatzouni
and Clarke
[58],2007
50 FF-MLP [50] Inter-keystroke latency,
Hold-time
Inter-
keystroke12.2%,
Hold-time
between
36.8% -
50.02%
- - - -
Zahid et al.
[59], 2009
25 Naive Bayes
[44], BPNN [60],
RBFN [42], Kstar
[40] and J48 [39]
Hold time, Times
backspace is pressed,
Horizontal & Vertical
Digraphs, Non-
Adjacent Horizontal &
Vertical Digraphs
Lower than
2% in
detection
mode
Close to 0%
after verifica-
tion of PIN
- - -
Gascon et. al
[62], 2014
315 Linear Support
Vector Machines
[33]
Simple Statistics,
Spline Coefficients,
Spline Simple
Statistics, iFFT Spline
Features, iFFT Signal
Features
- - Non-
identifiable
35%,
identifiable
users 1%
Non-
identifiable
58%,
identifiable
users 92%
-
participants. The authors used five different PINs for testing:
3-2-4-4, 1-1-1-1, 5-5-5-5, 1-2-5-9-7-3-8-4 and 1-2-5-9-8-4-1-
6. The participant has to enter the PIN error-free, and the PIN
has to be entered at least 25 times. This gathered enough error-
free action for analysis. The authors used one-class learning
based on the notion of nearest neighbor distance [67]. If the
distance is large, the probability is that the person holding
the device is an imposter. The proposed approach obtained
EERs for all five inputs, which were between 3.58% for the
PIN 3-2-4-4 and 7.34% for 5-5-5-5. The other results were
6.96% for 1-1-1-1, 4.55% for 1-2-5-9-7-3-8-4 and 4.45% for
1-2-5-9-8-4-1-6.
3) Graphic Touch Gesture Feature: Zhao et al. [68]
implemented an approach called the Graphic Touch Gesture
Feature (GTGF). GTGF is implemented on the Android
OS. This application captures and observes touch gestures
using a standard API of the Android system. When users
start touching the screen, the application begins to record
the trace as raw touch samples from the API. In each trace,
the system can monitor an event flag, absolute event time
in milliseconds and (x,y) coordinates. It can also capture
tactile pressure for each contacted finger. The authors used
6 sessions, which were divided into two groups. The first
group, containing only one session, called UH-TOUCHv1,
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Figure 5: Non-Intrusive User Verification Architecture
evaluated features and verified the design of the authentication
system. The second group called UH-TOUCHv2, included
5 sessions and used continuous authentication. The authors
asked 30 subjects to participate in this experiment. The
authors collected more than 300 touch gestures from
subjects. Figures . 6 and 7 outline examples of extracted
features. Each sub-figure contains 10 traces from a single user.
Figure 6: Over 300 touch traces of zoom-in gestures from
30 users. From [68], With permission.
Figure 7: Examples of GTGF extraction. From [68], With
permission.
Zhao et al. evaluated the performance of GTGF with
the 3 metrics including L1 distance [69], L2 distance or
Euclidean Distance [48] and normalized cross correlation
[70]. The authors found the following values for the metrics:
11.28%, 12.38%, and 17.29% for L1 distance, L2 distance
and the normalized cross correlation, respectively. This means
that L1 distance works better than the other metrics. The
authors used the UH-TOUCHv2 dataset for assessing the
approach, evaluating it by using ROC curves for four fusion
schemes, which are: GTGF–A: a scheme that computes all
six gestures from the proposed approach, GTGF–S: a scheme
that used only single gestures (slide up, down, left and right),
GTGF–M: a scheme that used multiple gestures (Zoom
in/Zoom out), TA-A: a scheme that used six gestures from
in the approach in [24] and DM-A: which used six gestures
from [71]. Fig. 8 shows a comparison using ROC curves of
all six fusion schemes. The best performance was achieved by
the GTGF-A approach (which used EER) at 2.62% while the
worst performance was from GTGF–M approach at 7.81%.
The results for the other three approaches are: GTGF–S
4.31%, TA-A 6.07% and DM-A 7.06%. The authors justified
the good results due to the use of tactile pressure, which
contains extra clues about the subject’s muscle behavior and
the extraction of dynamic movement and dynamic pressure
from the touch gesture during feature extraction.
Figure 8: A comparison on ROC curves for different fusion
schemes. From [68], With permission.
4) Re-Authentication Model Based on Movements of
a User’s Finger: Li et al. [20] proposed a method for
smartphones to re-authenticate users. This method focuses on
examining the movements of a user’s fingers and learning
movement patterns. This process keeps running in the
background and continuously monitors the current user’s
finger movements, in order to compare these movement
patterns to the owner’s patterns. This approach does not need
assistance from the user to re-authenticate behavior. The
methodology can be adapted to other platforms, and it clearly
shows that gathering information on finger movement to
construct a continuous re-authentication model, without the
user’s knowledge is practical. Figure. 9 shows the architecture
of the re-authentication model.
Li et al.’s [20] model, used two Motorola Droid phones
to gather data. The phones have the following features:
550MHz A8 processor, 256MB memory, 16GB SD-CARD
and Android 2.2.2 OS. To collect gesture data, 75 participants
used the smartphones without constraints for several days.
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Figure 9: Architecture of Re-authentication Model
They were allowed to access websites such as online social
networks and were able to download OSNs’ applications to
these devices.
Users had a choice of using or ignoring security
mechanisms. The participants were categorized into two
groups. The first group of 28 was asked to use the
smartphones with at least 150 sliding up, 150 sliding down,
150 sliding right, 150 sliding left, and 300 flip gestures. The
second group of participants included 47 users who use the
phones for a total of fifteen minutes.
The authors used an open-source Android application that
observes movements of the user’s fingers and categorizes
them into: sliding up or down, sliding right or left and
flipping. The monitoring is done in the background. This
application also records touch events, reading the data sent to
the Linux kernel, which is responsible for forwarding data to
the upper layer of the Android library. Since this data can be
read only from lower layers, the program needs root privilege.
The authors used SVM [33] for training purposes. Li et
al. [20] computed the average time interval for each gesture
type in the collected user data. For example, a sliding up
gesture occurs every 8.24 seconds in portrait mode. This
means the approach has the ability to re-validate authenticity
of a user by considering sliding up gestures every two minutes.
The authors evaluated overhead, accuracy and performance
for their approach and found that the results of the
experiments were affected by many factors. First, to assess
re-authentication frequency, they kept track of the number
of gestures needed to perform re-authentication. The authors
found that FAR and FRR were stable once the block-size
equaled 14. They also observed that, for the tap gesture,
FAR and FRR become constant once the block size was
approximately 20. The tap gesture exhibits the worst
performance with the highest FAR and FRR among the
gestures. The second factor that affects the accuracy of
module classification is the size of the training data set.
Results from performance testing of the classification module
exhibited a behavior where the accuracy initially rose with
the size of the training set, but it then reached a maximum
and decreased thereafter. The researchers recorded 500 as the
optimum point for modules with a single gesture and 300 for
the category of modules with combination gestures. Another
thing to note is that the authors found that modules with
tap as a supplementary gesture produced better results than
those with only sliding gestures. Modules with sliding left
gestures were deemed to have the best results, while those
with portrait and landscape sliding down gestures had the
worst results. The results obtained were FAR of 4% and FRR
of 4%, which were the best results the authors obtained.
5) Touchalytic system continuous authentication: Frank
et al. [24] discussed the question of whether or not
touchscreen input is effective as a behavioral biometric for
continuous authentication. They demonstrated that simple
touch movements are enough to verify a user. They introduced
an approach, which is known as the Touchalytic system for
data collection. Frank et al.’s [24] system gathered touch data
from Android phones, by creating an application for reading
documents and comparing multiple photos and images. To
collect data, users were asked to read a few documents from
Wikipedia. The users were also asked to spot differences
among photos presented to them. While users read or browsed
images, their actions were observed to extract raw movement
features. The raw features can be event codes, which include
finger up, down, move or multi-touch events. Data collected
consists of the pressure on the screen, the area of the screen
covered by the finger, the finger orientation with respect
to the screen and the screen orientation. For the primary
study, the overall experiment time ranged between 25 and
50 minutes per subject. A single reading trial usually takes
between ten and fifteen minutes while each image comparison
trial takes approximately 3 to 4 minutes. There were 41
participants in the study and 4 different smartphones with
similar specifications are used. The authors extracted 30
touch features once the user logged into the devices. They
used k-NN [52] and Gaussian kernel Support Vector Machine
[72] for training users profiles. Using Touchalytic, the authors
obtained EER between 2%-3% for intersession authentication,
EER 0% for intra-session, and under 4% for tests carried out
one week after the enrollment phase.
6) Identity Protection Service (TIPS): Feng et al. [73]
presented a mechanism for touch analysis called Identity
Protection Service (TIPS). The objective of this approach is to
resolve three main issues: dealing with data in an uncontrolled
environment, enhancing accuracy and achieving real time
recognition. TIPS collects behavioral and contextual features
and works by gathering gesture input data. This approach runs
two contextual applications, which are a multi-touch driver and
a context listener. TIPS always runs in the background and
checks touch data continuously. It incorporates information
about contextual applications to perform user authentication.
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Figure. 10 shows the architecture of the TIPS strategy.
Figure 10: Structure of TIPS Scheme
For testing, the authors allocated 23 smart devices (8
Galaxy S3, 3 Galaxy S4, 12 Nexus 4) to 13 users who
used 100 gestures. The experiment consisted of two phases.
First, in the off-device simulation phase, Matlab2 was used
to construct and analyze off-device touchscreen data for 3
weeks. The second phase was an on-device testing phase, in
which online training and testing modules were combined
into the TIPS service. 2,000 touch gestures were collected
for each user over a week. The user has the ability to set
the mode to either training or notification, and also the
authentication length parameter. In order to classify a variety
of touchscreen gestures, the authors used a combination of
the One Nearest Neighbor (1NN) classifier [74] and Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [65].
Feng et al. [73] assessed their approach in two situations.
First, they evaluated the off-device situation. They estimated
performance by setting various authentication lengths. They
built four different template libraries with different sizes,
and found that once they minimize the size of the templates,
accuracy decreases. They also observed that the accuracy
improves once the authentication length is increased. The
approach reached 91% for TP and 93% for TN. The authors
also calculated the power consumption of their approach,
and the average of the energy usage was 88mW. The battery
usage was below 6.2%.
7) Authenticating using Keystroke Dynamics and Finger
Pressure: Saevanee and Bhattarakosol [75] implemented a
method, which tries to detect and recognize users in terms
of hold-time, inter-key and finger pressure. This approach
combined the use of both keystroke and touchscreen patterns.
The authors asked 10 subjects to type their phone number
repeatedly 30 times. Values like finger pressure and finger
position were recorded every 20 ms. They collected 3,000
values of hold-time, 2,700 values of inter-key and 3,000
values of finger pressure. For classification, the authors used
2http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/
Probabilistic Neural Networks (PNN) [76], which estimate the
probability density functions from a set of training patterns.
The authors evaluated this approach in two ways. First, they
combined three metrics producing an EER of 9%. Second,
when hold-time and inter-key metrics were used together,
the EER was 29%. These results show that the values of
EER are not good enough because this approach rejects
legitimate users with high probability, leading to constant
re-authentication of the user.
8) Progressive Authentication when Entering PINs with
face and speaker Recognition: Riva et al. [77] measured
the user’s frequency of entering a PIN with or without
progressive authentication. The aim of this work is to reduce
the authentication overhead on smartphone devices, and
to make authentication a viable solution for users who
currently do not use security locks on their devices. They
also considered the number of unauthorized authentications.
To validate the system, the authors recruited 20 subjects. The
authors compared SVM [33], Decision Tree [39] and Linear
Regression [78] and computed Precision and Recall, and
found that SVM [33] achieved better results than the other
two algorithms. The approach decreased the number of times
a user is requested to enter a PIN by 42%. The recall for
SVM was 92.5%. SVMs [33] produced false authentications
at a rate of less than 8%.
The approach enhances performance from both a conve-
nience and a security perspective by using a high/low risk
factor F . Risk factor F is a variable that is associated with
either increased or decreased risk. Table VI shows that the
authors used different models with different risk factors F . It
compares risk factors in terms of FA and FR, between private
and confidential applications versus when risk factor is equal
to 1 (represents baseline without loss function and shows the
inference model for security).
Table VI: Comparison among risk factors in terms of percent-
age of false authentications and false rejections for private (FA
Priv and FR Priv) and confidential (FA Conf and FR Conf)
applications
Risk Factor FA pv FR pr FA Con FR Con
0.05 3.3 0.0 57.7 100.0
0.2 3.6 0.0 55.8 100.0
1 4.9 0.0 53.5 98.4
5 5.8 0.0 39.9 96.8
20 16.1 0.0 34.4 96.8
Table VI shows that increases in F can lead to rise in
the percentage of FAs for private applications from 4.9% to
16.1%. In contrast, when F = 20, FR comes down to 34.4%.
In such a case, the user has to enter the PIN for private
applications one out of three times, while he or she must
enter the PIN for confidential applications every time. In this
situation, the FR confidential is 96.8%.
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The authors calculated accuracy in different settings,
such as using and not using sensors, using and not using
face and speaker recognition. The model’s accuracy varied
from 83% to 100% when all sensors were used and from
76% to 99% if only accelerometers were used. Without
an added Gadgeteer3 sensor, a platform used to construct
small electronic devices, the model still provides for high
accuracy. For face recognition, a 94% accuracy was achieved
with minimal discrepancy among users. A small decreased
in accuracy is observed in fluctuating light situations.
Varying results were obtained in the accuracy of the speaker
identification model; the average accuracy was around 59.3%
for 3 users, with a high of 83.7%, and a low of 0.4%. The
varying results can be attributed to different conditions during
the time of recording (e.g., distance between the user and
speaker for example; if a user is talking or the device is in
the pocket), and background noise such as noise from air
conditioner and keyboard typing.
9) Authentication based on Curve Training: Burgbacher
et al. [79] introduced a method that gathers information
from users as they trace curves. First, the approach randomly
generated 19 curves where the starting and ending points
were shown to indicate the trace direction. Then, each user
was asked to trace this curve with his/her finger. The authors
extracted X-Y coordinates to represent finger location and
timestamps for each location. The authors recruited 42
participants, 12 female, 30 male. 6 of the subjects used their
left hand whereas the rest used right hand. To eliminate
any sensor noise and outliers, they divided the curves into
small segments in a pre-processing step. Burgbacher et al.
[79] extracted curve segments using k-NN [52] and compute
the similarity between two segments by employing Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [65]. To evaluate this approach, the
authors performed a 10-fold cross-validation. They obtained
EER between 10% -20%.
10) Fingergestures Authentication System using
Touchscreen (FAST): Feng et al. [80] introduced a
touchscreen-based approach, known as Fingergestures
Authentication System using Touchscreen (FAST). The
authors used digital gloves that contain a sensor (IMU
digital combo boards ITG3200/ADXL345), with 6 degrees
of freedom to collect the movement of fingers. The system
collects data when a user flicks, spreads, taps, types or
enters phone numbers and draws shapes. FAST gathers X-Y
coordinates, speed, pressure and directions of finger motions.
To evaluate FAST, Feng et al. [80] recruited 40 participants.
They divided subjects into two groups. The first group of 11
subjects used sensor gloves while the second group did not
wear anything. Both groups performed six gestures: down
to up swipe, up to down swipe, left to right swipe, right to
left swipe, zoom-in, and zoom-out. The authors collected 53
features for each touch gesture. They also captured 36 triaxial
3http://www.netmf.com/gadgeteer/
angular rate features.
The authors used three classification algorithms for
evaluating FAST: (J48) Decision tree [39], Random Forest
[46] and Bayes Net [43]. The authors compared the three
classifiers in two situations, which were with and without
gloves. They compared all three algorithms in terms of
FAR and FRR. The Random Forest Classifier has the best
result in terms of FAR while the Bayes Net classifier has
the best results in terms of FRR. When using the Bayes
Net classifier for single touch gestures, FAST obtained FAR
of 11.96% and a FRR of 8.53% when not using external
sensors, while it got FAR of 2.15% and a FRR of 1.63%
when using sensor gloves. For multi-touch gestures, the
authors also applied these classifiers to the system. FAST
with Bayes Net classifier obtained FAR of 14.02% and FRR
of 18.92%. This result shows that FAST does not achieve the
requirement of a good authentication design. As a result, the
authors implemented the system based on a sequence-based
authentication mechanism which uses time threshold. This
new approach was achieved a FAR of 4.66% and a FRR of
0.13%.
11) LatentGesture: Saravanan et al. [81] introduced an
approach called LatentGesture that analyzes events for
touch interactions with user interface elements like buttons,
checkboxes and sliders. It extracts features such as position
on screen, time, frequency and pressure. To collect data,
Saravanan et al. recruited 20 subjects. All subjects used two
devices, a Nexus 4 phone and Nexus 7 tablet. The authors
use Lib-SVM [34] and Random Forests [46] to perform
unary classifications. The authors evaluated the approach in
two situations, multi-and single-users authentications. For
single-user authentication, the accuracy achieved was 97.9%
on the phone and 96.79% on the tablet. For the multi-user
authentication, the accuracy achieved was 100% on the tablet
and 97.78% on the phone.
12) Authentication using only 3 Gesture Features: Shahzad
et al. [82] implemented a Gesture based Authentication
scheme for secure unlocking of Touchscreen devices (GEAT).
GEAT uses several sensors to determine how users input data.
These sensors are finger velocity, device acceleration and
stroke time. GEAT has three phases. The first phase collects
gestures from the touchscreen. In this phase, the subject is
asked to touch the screen between 15-25 times. The second
phase is based on extracting features from the data collected.
The third phase constructs models to classify each gesture
using machine learning.
The authors used Samsung smartphones and recruited 50
subjects. Each subject used the device for approximately
7-10 days. 15009 gestures were gathered during a period of
5 months. The authors employed Support Vector Distribution
Estimation (SVDE) [83] with the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) kernel [42] for classification. They used the open
source implementation of SVDE in libSVM [34]. The authors
used the EER metric for evaluation. The results show that
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by using three gestures and 25 training samples, GEAT can
achieve an average Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.5%.
13) Touch Dynamics Authentication Scheme: Meng
et al. [84] implemented a scheme that uses 21 features for
authentication, called the touch-dynamics-based authentication
system. It has three phases, which are data collection or
acquisition of data once a user touches this screen and
conversion of the data into meaningful features; behavior
modeling to analyze the data, e.g., extracted features
to produce signatures for legitimate users; and behavior
comparison to compare between current behavior and
produced signatures to make a decision if the user is
legitimate or not.
The authors used Google/HTC Nexus One Android
phone and recruited 20 subjects. Data collected include
X-Y coordinates, timestamps, and input characteristics like
single or multi-touch. Each subject finished 6 sessions
within 3 days. In each session, the subject spent at least
10 minutes. The authors gathered 120 sessions for all subjects.
Meng et al. [84] used five classification algorithms to
validate the scheme. These classifiers were: (J48) Decision
Tree [39], Naive Bayes [44], Kstar [40], Radial Basis Function
Network (RBFN) [42] and Back Propagation Neural Network
(BPNN) [60]. The authors used WEKA [38] implementations
of the classifiers and evaluated the system in terms of EER.
The best results were from RBFN [42] and BPNN [60],
which were 7.71% and 11.58%, respectively although the
results are still very high. The other classifiers had ERR
between 15% and 24%. To enhance the results, the authors
implemented a hybrid classifier called PSO-RBFN, which
decreased the error rate to 2.92%.
14) Continuous and Passive Authentication via Touch
Biometrics: Xu et al. [85] discussed an authentication
scheme based on touchscreen. This approach has two phases,
training,to model the valid subject, and an authentication
phase, to make a decision if the user is legitimate or not. The
authors recruited 32 subjects for collecting data. Each subject
had to own his/her smartphone device, and received a $6 gift
for his/her participation. The authors gathered 50 touches in
each experiment and a total of 1200 touch data sequences
from each subject. The authors chose SVM [33] for the user
authentication approach. They used Radial Basis Function
(RBFN) kernel [42] in their approach. The authors found that
their approach could achieve EER less than 10% for all four
types keystroke, slide, handwriting and pinch. However, the
slide operation had achieved best accuracy, which is 0.75% as
the number of training examples were increased from 5 to 28 .
15) Multitouch Gesture-based Authentication: Sea-Bea
et al. [86] discussed how to enhance user authentication
using multi-touch gestures. They implemented a method
with several phases, which are pre-processing in which the
gesture data for each touching of the screen is relabeled
based on the corresponding fingertip; feature transformation
to extract translation and rotation invariant features to
represent the gestures; computing pairwise distance between
an enrolled sample and a gesture input; and score calculation
by computing dissimilarity scores from pairwise distances.
The authors employed hand geometry and muscle behavior
in their study.
The authors recruited 34 subjects to participate (24 male,
10 female) and used iPad 1 (16 GB) running iOS 3.2. to
collect features. Each subject performed 22 pre-defined
gestures 10 times. After every gesture, the subject filled a
survey about the ease of use of the gesture before moving to
the next gesture. The authors used Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) [65] to calculate the distance between two multi-
touch gestures, using three metrics for computing the cost
function: Manhattan [87], Euclidean [48], and cosine distance
[88]. The authors allowed several single gestures such as
Counter-Clock Wise rotation (CCW), pinch, drag and swipe.
The verification accuracy achieved was 90%. Average EER
observed was 10.68%. Combining CCW, Pinch, and Swipe
gestures together, the approach achieved EER of 6.52%. The
system obtained the best EER of 4.03% when using a local
threshold that combined a user-defined gesture with the CCW
gesture.
16) Lightweight Touch Dynamics Approach: Meng et al.
[89] implemented a lightweight approach, which used 8 touch
gestures in order to decrease the time needed for processing
data. These gestures were based on a number of touch
movements, single and multiple touches and have different
speeds, durations and pressures. The authors recruited 50
subjects (26 male, 24 female) to participate in 25 sessions
(1250 sessions of 120 touch events each) in 3 days. Each
study used a Google/HTC Nexus One Android phone. The
authors chose five classifiers, which are as Decision Tree [39],
Naive Bayes [44], Radial Basis Function Network (RBFN)
[42], Back Propagation Neural Network (BPNN) [60], and
PSO-RBFN [84]. The PSO-RBFN classifier achieved the best
performance with an average EER of 2.46% (FAR=2.55%,
FRR=2.37%).
17) Choosing Suitable Classifiers Using a Cost Metric:
Meng et al. [90] developed a mechanism for choosing
suitable classifiers to validate users. The implemented
approach extracted 6 features, which are the number of touch
movements per session (NTM), the number of single-touch
events per session (NST), the number of multi-touch events
per session (NMT), the average duration of touch movements
per session (ATTM), the average duration of single-touch
events per session (ATST) and the average duration of
multi-touch events per session (ATMT). The authors recruited
50 participants (27 male, 23 female) to their study for 25
sessions. Each session includes 100 touch gesture for each
event.
The authors chose three classifiers, which were (J48) De-
cision Tree [39], Naive Bayes [44] and k-NN [52]. For five
subjects, the results show that selection of the classifier may
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vary with user input after each experiment. For example, for
user2, the J48 classifier was selected at the 1st and the 4th
experiments with cost values (cost value means the relative
expected cost, to evaluate different classifiers) of 1.3451 and
1.3641, respectively, while the Naive Bayes classifier was
selected at the second and third experiments with cost values
of 1.3221 and 1.3741, respectively. For the last experiment,
k-NN outperforms the other classifiers with the cost values of
1.3321. Table VII illustrates the process of classifier selection.
Table VII: The process of classifier selection
User 1st Ex-
periment
2nd Ex-
periment
3rd Ex-
periment
4th Ex-
periment
5th Ex-
periment
1 IBK =
1.3765
J48 =
1.3046
J48 =
1.2765
J48
=1.2712
IBK =
1.2487
2 J48 =
1.3451
NBayes
= 1.3221
NBayes=
1.3741
J48=
1.3641
IBK =
1.3321
3 IBK =
1.4181
IBK =
1.3872
J48 =
1.3175
NBayes
= 1.3760
J48 =
1.3029
4 IBK =
1.3141
IBK =
1.3524
J48 =
1.3121
J48 =
1.2654
J48 =
1.2342
5 J48 =
1.3742
NBayes
= 1.3891
IBK =
1.3076
IBK =
1.3421
J48 =
1.2432
The authors calculated the accuracy for the system in
terms of FAR and FRR. The proposed scheme obtained FRR
between 5.87% and 6.65% and FAR between 6.98% and
7.74%.
18) Multi-Touch Passwords (MT-Lock): Oakley and
Bianchi [91] investigated the effect of multiple touches when
inputting passwords in an approach known as Multi-Touch
Passwords for Mobile Device Access (MT-Lock). MT-Lock
explores how users create and input passwords. The authors
asked 10 subjects to participate in their approach (8 male, 2
female). They used an Android Nexus S smartphone (4 inch
touch screen, 800x480 resolution) to gather data. Each subject
typed his/her selected password six times, one time for saving
the password and the rest as repetition. The authors evaluated
their approach in terms of EER, and found it achieved the 8%.
19) Authentication based on Keystroke, Slide, Handwriting
and Pinch: Xu et al. [85] introduced a mechanism using
touch gestures and investigate how to implement continuous
validation for the legitimate user based on modeling multiple
types of touch gestures. The process was based on two phases,
a training phase: using labeled touch data from valid users,
and an authentication phase used to compare if data come
from legitimate or impostor users. The authors implemented
a separation-of-concerns approach; a set of methods that
considers separately each type of touch operations Keystroke,
Slide, Handwriting and Pinch with its corresponding sequence
of raw events.
The authors recruited 32 subjects for their experiment.
They used Galaxy SII smartphone with Android OS 4.1.2
to collect features and gathered 200 touch data sequences
from each subject. The authors used Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [33] and performed a 10-fold cross validation with
nine subsets for training and one for testing. This approach
achieved EER below 10% for all four types, and the best
accuracy was achieved for the Slide operation that obtained
EER of 0.64%.
20) Touch-based Intrusion Detection: Damopoulos et al.
[92] implemented an approach for iPhone devices using a
touch logger that collected all touch events occurring on the
screen. This approach can be used as an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) to identify possible intrusion. The authors
recruited 18 subjects who owned iPhone devices. Each
subject was asked to download an app that collected touch
data for 24 hours. The app worked in the background and send
back the log files containing touch data records. One user was
referred to as the authorized user while rest of the 17 users
represented attackers. The data fields in a log file were the
following: Event, X, Y, Timestamps, and Attacker/Authorized.
Here, Event was the type of touching of the touchscreen, X
and Y were the coordinates of the touchscreen, Timestamp
was the UNIX timestamp that gave the date and time a touch
event occurred, and Attacker/Authorized was a boolean that
indicated if the event belonged to the owner or an attacker.
The authors evaluated the approach using four algorithms:
Bayesian Networks, Radial Basis Function (RBF) [42],
K-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) [52] and Random Forest [46].
The Random Forest achieved the best result in terms of
accuracy, which was 99.2%.
21) Authentication by Drawing: Angulo and Wastlund
[93] discussed the possibility of introducing a method for
smartphone authentication based on drawing patterns on the
touchscreen. This approach works on the Android platform
and for testing, the authors collected patterns drawn by 32
subjects. Each subject had to draw three different patterns
within a certain time and each pattern had to contain 6
dots. The implemented application collected data such as
speed of finger travel from one dot to another, and the time
in milliseconds from the moment the finger touched a dot
to the moment the finger was pulled outside the dot area.
The authors used several classifiers and metrics to compare
the performance of the proposed approach: Random Forest
[46], SVM [33], Recursive Partitioning (RPart) classifiers
[94], Manhattan distance [87], Mahalanobis distance [49]
and Euclidean distance [48]. They evaluated the approach in
terms of EER and the best algorithm was the Random Forest
classifier with average EER of 10.3% when an impostor
already knew the user’s secret pattern.
22) Authenticating using Features of Host and Cloud-based
IDS: Damopoulos et al. [95] implemented a dynamic hybrid
mobile IDS framework on iOS smartphones by introducing
a method that combined features from host and cloud
based anomaly detection systems. This framework used four
different detection methods: SMS profiling, monitoring of
applications behavior via iDMA, a touch logger profiler (iTL)
and a keystroke-based authentication system. The authors
collected traces from real users’ profiles, and used Decision
Trees [39] and Random Forest [46] as learning algorithms.
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They ran experiments to measure detection accuracy as well
as CPU, memory and battery usages, and the time to detect
a malicious application. The authors hosted the IDS on the
iPhone 5s, and used AWS Amazon’s EC2 infrastructure as
the cloud service. The authors calculated the computational
overhead and obtained CPU consumption between 20-45%
and memory consumption between 62-78%.
Tables VIII and IX summarize current studies that use
touchscreen behavior.
D. Gait Based Authentication
A new approach to validating users is gait biometric. Gait
biometric aims to identify and verify users’ walking styles
such as how a person moves at normal or fast pace [96]. Fig.
11 shows main approaches to gait biometric.
Figure 11: Gait Approaches
The first two approaches that use machine vision and
floor sensors are not applicable in the case of smartphones.
Therefore, we concentrate on the Wearable Sensor based
(WS) approach.
Wearable Sensors are devices worn on the bodies of
subjects in order to gather information. Information can be
collected using a motion recording system, which allows
subjects to wear devices at any location on the human
body, such as waist, belt, trouser pockets and hand. Sensors
like accelerometer, speed sensors [97], gyroscope and force
sensors may also be used.
Gait features can be extracted using cyclic and non-cyclic
methods [98]. A cyclic approach works in two steps. First,
cycles in gait are identified in terms of time series. Features of
these cycles are computed to extract characteristic templates
for classification. This approach is easier to implement than
a non-cyclic approach, which requires computing features
without prior identification of cycles. A non-cyclic method
chooses time intervals during walking to capture locations of
sensors.
In this section, we discuss 13 gait-based approaches in
terms of their particular methods, data acquisition, type of
classifiers used and results obtained. Table XII summarizes
the current studies using walking approaches.
1) Gait Using Wavelet Transform and SVMs: Hestbek et.
al [99] introduced a method using wearable sensors and non-
cyclic feature extraction. This approach measures acceleration
in 3 spatial dimensions: vertical X , anteroposterior Y and
mediolateral Z.
The number of participants in Hestbek’s study was 36,
and the average length of sessions was 24 days. On each
day, subjects were asked to walk up to 30 minutes in various
manners of walking. One episode of walk is defined as
walking the entire distance between two ends of a hallway.
Each individual was asked to walk in 3 ways in sequence:
12 steps using normal gait, then 16 steps at a quick pace and
finally 12 steps at normal walking speed. The authors used
Wavelet Transforms (WT) [100] to process signal information.
The approach divided a signal into low-pass and high-pass
information to represent coarse and clear variations based on
time domain. The authors used DWT [65] to represent and
transform the spatial data into Approximation signals and
Detail coefficients.
The authors used SVMs [33] for classification of the data
into two groups, authorized and unauthorized subjects. The
authors experimented with 9 different feature sets, which
combine Bark-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (BFCC) and
Standard Deviation (SD), and approximation and detail coeffi-
cients of gait templates. Feature sets 1 and 2 were previously
used by [98] while the rest of the sets were extension by
Hestbek et al. with Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [99].
Table X shows all 9 feature sets.
Hestbek et al. divided their experiments into training and
testing phases. The authors used three evaluation metrics,
which are False Match Rate (FMR), False Non-Match Rate
(FNMR), and Half Total Error Rate (HTER). After experi-
ments with various interpolation rates, segmentation lengths
and different wavelets, the authors found that the Haar Transfer
procedure [101] had the best accuracy. As a result, the authors
used Haar Transform in further experiments. They also found
the best interpolation rate is 400Hz and the best segment
length was 10 seconds. The best feature set obtained FMR
= 3.48%, FNMR = 34.36% and HTER = 18.92. Values of
FNMR were improved using a voting method [98], which
reduces the number of legitimate persons who were incorrectly
rejected. The values obtained using feature set 6 were FMR
= 9.82%, FNMR = 10.45% and HTER = 10.14. Using the
voting method, the approach achieved FMR = 9.82%, FNMR
= 10.45% and HTER = 10.14. Table XI provides a comparison
of all 9 feature sets in terms of FMR, FNMR and HTER.
2) Gait Authentication and Identification using Wearable
Accelerometer Sensor: Gafurov et al. [102] used an
accelerometer sensor attached to the trouser pocket of the
subject to gather gait features. The authors used cyclic
features. The goal of this study is to measure performance
in identification and authentication when a user walks
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Table VIII: Examples of Touchscreen Behavior
Study Datasets Classifier Used Feature RESULT
EER FAR FRR Accuracy Energy
usage
Battery
usage
De Luca et al.
[64], 2012
26 DTW [65] X-Y coordinates, Pres-
sure, Size, Time
20% 21% 19%,
77%
- - -
Zheng et al.
[66], 2014
80 1 Class Classi-
fication [67]
Acceleration, Pressure,
Size, Hold time, Inter-
key
3.58% ,
7.34%
- - - - -
Zhao et al.
[68], 2013
30 L1 Distance
[69], L2
Distance [48],
Normalized
Cross
Correlation
[70]
Time duration, Length
of touch traces, Direc-
tions and speeds of fin-
ger movements, Tac-
tile pressures
GTGF-A
2.62%
- - - - -
Li et al. [20],
2013
75 SVM [33] Users’ finger move-
ments
- 4% 4% - - -
Frank et al.
[24], 2013
41 k-NN [52],
Gaussian
kernel SVM
[72]
X-Y coordinates, Pres-
sure, Speed, Length of
trajectory, Inter-stroke
time, Phone orienta-
tion, Finger orienta-
tion, Stroke duration
2%-3% (in-
tersession),
0% (Intra-
session)
- - - - -
Feng et al.
[73], 2014
13 1NN
[74],DTW
[65]
Touch Location,
Swipe/Zoom
Length, Swipe/Zoom
Curvature
- - - - 88 mW 6.2%
Shahzad et al.
[82], 2012
50 SVDE [83],
RBF [42]
Velocity magnitude,
Device acceleration,
Stroke time, Inter-
stroke time, Stroke
displacement
magnitude, Stroke
displacement
direction, Velocity
direction.
0.5% - - - - -
Feng et al.
[80], 2012
40 J48 [39],
Random
Forest [46]
,Bayes Net
[43]
Gesture type, X-
Y coordinates,
Directions of the finger
motion, Finger motion
speed, Pressure,
Distance between
multi-touch points
11.96%
(No gloves)
2.15%
(gloves),
4.66%
(sequence-
based)
8.53% (No
gloves)
sensors,
1.63%
(gloves),
0.13%
(sequence-
based)
- - - -
Riva et al.
[77], 2012
20 SVM [33], J48
[39], Linear
Regression
[78]
Placement of the
phone, Time, Voice,
Proximity of phone,
Confidence
- - - SVM 92.5%,
83%-100%
(all sensors),
76%-99%
(accelerometers)
- -
Saravanan et
al. [81], 2014
20 Lib-SVM
[34], Random
Forests [46]
Pressure, Timestamps,
X-Y coordinates
- - - 97.9% (phone-S),
96.79% (tablet-
S), 97.78%
(phone-M) 100%
(tablet-M)
- -
Saevanee &
Bhattarakosol
[75], 2009
10 Neural
Networks
(PNN) [76]
Inter-key, Hold-time,
Finger pressure
9% (All
features),
29% (hold-
time &
inter-key)
- - - - -
Burgbacher et
al. [79], 2014
42 k-NN [52]
DTW [65]
Location of the finger-
tip, Timestamps
10% -20% - - - - -
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Table IX: Examples of Touchscreen Behavior
Study Datasets Classifier Used Feature RESULT
EER FAR FRR AccuracyEnergy
usage
Battery
usage
Meng et al.
[84], 2013
20 J48 [39], Naive Bayes
[44], Kstar [40],
RBFN [42],BPNN
[60]
Gesture Type, X-Y coor-
dinates, Time
PSO-RBFN
(RBFN +
BPNN) =
2.92%
- - - - -
Xu et al. [85],
2014
32 SVM [33],RBFN [42] Time, X-Y coordinates,
Pressure, Size
10% (All fea-
tures), 0.75%
(slide)
- - - - -
Sea-Bea et al.
[86], 2014
34 (DTW) [65], Manhat-
tan [87], Euclidean
[48], Cosine distance
[88]
Palm movement, Fingertip
movement, Dynamic fin-
gertip
4.03% (all ges-
tures)
- - - - -
Meng et al.
[89], 2014
50 J48 [39], Naive Bayes
[44], RBFN [42],
BPNN [60],PSO-
RBFN [84]
Pressure, Speed, X-Y co-
ordinates, Gesture type
PSO-RBFN
2.46%
2.55%,2.37% - - - -
Meng et al.
[90], 2014
50 J48 [39], Naı¨ve Bayes
[44],k-NN [52]
Touch movements, Single-
touch events, Multi-touch
events, Duration time of
touch movements, Dura-
tion time of single-touch,
Duration time of multi-
touch
- 6.98% -
7.74%
5.87% -
6.65%
- - -
Oakley and
Bianchi [91],
2012
10 - Raw touch events(press,
motion, release) Widget
and application level
events (buttons press,
strokes over)
8% - - - - -
Damopoulos
et al.
[92],2013
18 Bayesian [43], RBF
[42], k-NN [52] &
Random Forest [46]
Gesture type, X-Y coor-
dinates, Timestamps, In-
truder/Legit
- - - 99.2% - -
Angulo and
Wastlund [93],
2012
32 Random Forest [46],
SVM [33], Recursive
Partitioning (RPart)
[94], the Manhattan
[87], the Mahalanobis
[49] & Euclidean
[48]
Finger movement, Time 10.3% - - - -
Damopoulos
et al. [95],
2014
- J48 [39]& Random
Forest [46]
a-SMS Profiler (Number,
Timestamp, Flags,
Country, Intruder/Legit)
b- iTL (Touch Type, X-Y
coordinates, Timestamps,
Intruder/Legit) c-
Touchstroke (Hold-
time, Inter-time, Distance,
Speed,Intruder/Legit)
- - - - 20-45% 62-
78%
Table X: Feature Sets
Set Feature Acceleration Signal Coefficients
1 BFCC a,v [P 1]
2 BFCC a,v [P 6], [T 4 −−T 6]
3 BFCC,SD [a,v],[v] [P 1], [P 6, T 4 −−T 6]
4 BFCC,SD [a,v],[v] [P 1], [P 6, T 4, T 5]
5 BFCC,SD [a,v],[v] [P 1, P 2], [P 6, T 4, T 5]
6 BFCC,SD [a],[v] [P 1], [P 6, T 4 −−T 6 ]
7 BFCC,SD [b],[v] [P 1], [P 6, T 4 −−T 6]
8 BFCC,SD [c],[v] [P 1], [P 6, T 4 −−T 6]
9 BFCC,SD [v],[v] [P 1], [P 6, T 4 −−T 6]
while he/she may be carrying a backpack by calculating an
appropriate metric. In order to evaluate the performance of
the proposed approach from two perspectives, authentication
and identification, the authors used four methods, which are
absolute distance, correlation, histogram and higher order
moments. When calculating absolute distance and correlation,
they computed an average cycle for each subject as a feature
vector. The histogram feature uses n-bin (e.g., n=100) and
uses it as a feature vector. Computing skewness and kurtosis
was performed using higher order moments.
Gafurov et al. had 50 participants, and each participant had
to walk 4 normal walking episodes without a backpack and
then 2 walking episodes carrying a backpack. They collected
300 gait samples. The authors used Manhattan distance [87]
and Euclidean distance [48] to compute the dissimilarity
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Table XI: Evaluation Results of Recognition using at 400 Hz
and 10 seconds
Set FMR FNMR HTER
1 1.58% 40.56% 21.07
2 1.42% 44.19% 22.81
3 2.29% 39.16% 20.73
4 2.19% 39.27% 20.74
5 1.92% 40.06% 21.00
6 3.48% 34.36% 18.92
7 3.38% 63.80% 33.90
8 2.94% 62.85% 32.90
9 3.99% 48.44% 26.21
score between feature vectors. For authentication, the use
of absolute distance achieved the best performance with
values in the histogram and higher order moments used in
identification become very low. The performance deteriorated
from about 7.3% to about 9.3% in samples without backpack
to with backpack. For identification, recognition rate dropped
slightly from 86.3% to 86.2%.
3) Extracting Gait Cycle using Piecewise Linear
Approximation: Muaaz and Mayrhofer [103] implemented
a technique for extracting gait cycle using Piecewise Linear
Approximation (PLA). The authors introduced two approaches
to classify gait features: using a pre-computed data matrix and
using a pre-computed kernel matrix to help build an elastic
similarity measure. This elastic measure uses a function
called Gaussian Dynamic Time Warp (GDTW) kernel [104].
The authors asked 51 subjects to participate in this
approach. To collect data, the subjects attached Personal
Mobile Devices (PMDs) on the right hand of the hip. The
authors used two classifiers in two stages, which are Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [65] and Gaussian Dynamic Time
Warp (GDTW) kernel [104]. The authors evaluated their
approach with a method presented in [105] in terms of EER
in two ways: using PLA and not using PLA. Results obtained
without PLA are slightly higher than the ones achieved by
introducing PLA. For same day experiments, EER value with
PLA is 22.49% and without PLA is 16.26%. For different
day experiments, with PLA the EER is 33.3% while without
PLA it is 28.21%).
4) Using SVMs and HMMs for accelerometer-based bio-
metric gait recognition: Nickel et al. [106] used fixed-length
time segments for extracting features. The authors used SVMs
[33] and HMMs [107] for classifying to distinguish users.
Nickel et al. [106] asked 36 subjects to participate in
their study in two sessions. Each subject attached the phone
to his/her right hip and took 12 normal walks, 16 fast
walks and finally 12 normal walks. Subjects had to walk
on flat carpet. There were three preprocessing steps. The
first step, the mean sampling rate of the database was
127.46 data values per second (min= 109.19, max= 128.88).
Then, the sampled data was interpolated at 50, 100 and 200
data values per second. Finally, the data was segmented into
3 seconds, 5 seconds and 7.5 seconds with an overlap of 50%.
The authors used two machine learning algorithms, which
are the SVM implementation LIB-SVM [34] and HMM
implementation in the Hidden Markov Model Toolkit (HTK)
[108]. Normal walking obtained TER of 29.20% while
for fast walking, it was 30.87%. A voting method [98]
improved the results for HMM EER to 15.77% for normal
walk and to 14.39% for fast walk. For SVM, the TER is
20.01% for normal walk, while the EER of HMMs is 12.63%.
5) Walk Authentication using k-NN algorithm: Nickel et
al. [109] implemented an approach for classification of gaits
using the k-NN algorithm [52] and compared this approach
with theirs previous approach [106]. In this new approach,
Nickel et al. used the same dataset that was used in [106]
with 36 subjects. The mean sampling rate is 127 data values
per second. The data was divided into segments of fixed time
length, which was between 3 and 7.5s with an overlap of
50%. Euclidean distance [48] was used to compute distance
between the probe vector and stored instances. The k-NN
implementation of the WEKA [38] library was used. The
authors compared the results for this approach with their
approach in [106]. The lowest EER/HTER was between 8.24
and 8.85. A walking duration of five minutes for the training
phase was identified to be best for all algorithms. Based on
the error rates, no clearly best stochastic classifier could be
identified. A disadvantage of SVMs was that outliers occurred
in training, resulting in very high FNMRs. If this happens
during an experiment, the used classifier was unsuitable and
the experiment has to be repeated, resulting in lower usability.
k-NN gives the lowest HTER before and after voting [98].
6) Using Majority Voting Module and Cyclic Rotation
Metric Module for Gait Recognition: Nickel et al. [110]
implemented a method based on salience vectors, which
had a minimum height and distance of half the estimated
cycle length. The data obtained from 48 subjects, where each
participant had to walk on several different days. The phone
was inside a pouch which was attached to the right hip of the
subject. There were two sessions. In the enrollment session,
each participant had to walk straight for 10 seconds on a flat
floor. In the second session, the participant had to walk using
a predefined route three times. For each of the 48 subjects,
they obtained 28 data sets in each session, 2,688 in total.
The data was linearly interpolated to a fixed rate of 25, 50,
and 100 samples per second, and the interpolated data were
divided into segments of 2, 3, and 4 s, with an overlap of 50%.
The authors introduced two methods Majority Voting
Module; to calculate the reference cycles among enrollment
phase using DTW [65] and Cyclic Rotation Metric Module to
compare two sets using Manhattan distance [87] and DTW.
For a module using Majority Voting, the approach obtained
EER of 28% while it obtained 21.7% using cyclic rotation
metric.
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7) Classifying accelerometer data using Hidden Markov
Models: Nickel et al. [111] introduced another classifier
to compare with previous works. The author used the data
collection that was used in [110].
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [107] were used in this
approach. HMMs were trained using data from the subjects.
Given a probe feature vector, they obtained for each model
the probability that this model represented the probe data.
Classification was based on the difference between these
probabilities and a decision threshold. Calculated without
voting and using segments size of 4000, the EER was between
15.77% and 7.45%. When a segment size of 2s was used,
the EER was 7.33%. With same day evaluation, the EER
reached 0.71%. On the other hand, once the authors used
voting method [98], the approach obtained EER of 5.81%.
8) Cyclic Recognition using Voting: Derawi and Bours
[112] used Samsung Nexus S (Gingerbread operating system)
and implemented an application for collecting data. The
authors used 25 subjects for their experiments. All targets had
to attach the phone to pockets of their trousers. Derawi and
Bours divided participants into two groups. The first group
consisted of 5 subjects, who had to walk with three different
speeds and represented authorized people. The second group
contained 20 subjects for testing purposes, representing
impostors. All participants had to walk 30 meters. Each
subject walked 5 times at normal speed, 5 times at slow speed
and 5 times at fast speed. A total of 375 data samples (300
data samples are impostors and 75 are genuine) were collected.
The authors used Euclidean distance [48], Manhattan
distance [87], Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance
[65], and the Cross DTW (CDM) as distance metrics. The
authors also used several classifiers, which are Bayes Net
[43], Lib-SVM [34], Logistic Model Trees (LMT) [113],
Multilayer Percepton (MLP) [41], Naive Bayes [44], (RBFN)
[42] and Random Tree [46]. The best result was obtained
with LibSVM with an accuracy of 99.6%. Next, the RBFN
achieved 98.9%.
Global cross-validation was performed by merging the
data from all 25 subjects. The results indicate how different
normal, fast and slow walks are within a group of users.
The LibSVM and LMT [113] slightly outperformed the
other methods with recognition rates of 87.6% and 86.7%,
respectively. The correct classification probability of a walk
can be estimated from the correct classification probability of
the cycles, by simply using majority voting over the cycles
in a walk. Assume that at least 9 cycles are detected in a
walk, and assume that the correct classification probability
of a single cycle was as low as 80%. Even under these
assumptions, a walk was classified correctly in over 98% of
the cases. The data samples in the experiment represented a
walk of approximately 30 meters. For all these data samples,
the assumption was that at least 9 cycles detected were
always correct.
9) Recognition Gait Patterns with Accelerometers:
Mantyjarvi et al. [114] introduced a scheme to distinguish
and identify users based on walking patterns using acceleration
signals. They recruited 36 subjects, 19 males and 17 females,
to walk at three different speeds, fast, normal and slow. They
had to walk approximately 20 meters at the three speeds.
The data was collected over a period of 5 days. Each subject
had to wear the accelerometer on his/her belt in the back.
The accelerometer signals were recorded at 256 Hz sampling
frequency using a laptop computer equipped with National
Instruments DAQ 1200 card.
The authors compared four elements computed from the
signals, which are signal correlation, FFT coefficients (signal
values in the frequency domain), histogram and higher
order moments. The best value of EER achieved by signal
correlation method was 7%, with FFT coefficients 10%, with
higher order moments 18% and finally with histogram 19%.
10) User Authentication at Low-grade Acceleration:
Derawi et al. [115] presented a method that differs from
other approaches in terms of the level of gathered data. The
method focused on collecting data at low-grade acceleration,
while other studies concentrated in high-grade acceleration.
Data was collected using Google G1 mobile phones. The
authors asked each of 52 participants to attach the device on
the right side of the hip. Each participant had to walk 37
meters on flat carpet. A participant waited for 2 seconds at
the end, and then turned around, waited 2 more seconds, then
walked back the same distance.
The cycle length was extracted from the data and the range
was between 40-60 samples. To calculate the average cycle,
the authors eliminated all irregular cycles using Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [65].
The authors compared their approach with Holien’s
approach [116] in terms of EER. Derawi’s approach obtained
EER of 20.1% while Holien’s approach obtained 12.9%.
In Derawi’s approach, they used 40-50 samples per second
whereas Holien’s approach used 100 samples per second.
11) Recognition with Time-Delay Embeddings: Frank
et al. [117] introduced an approach for gait recognition
incorporating feature extraction using time-delay embedding
and supervised learning. Time- delay embedding is a technique
from analysis of nonlinear time series data, that aims to
reconstruct the state of an unknown dynamical system from
observations taken over time [118]. The authors also used an
algorithm to perform classification of activities in real-time.
This approach aims to decrease the computational complexity
and memory usage in conducting activity recognition.
The main idea is to extract features by employing time-
delay embeddings and a noise reduction phase. The resulting
features from these processes are used as input to the classifier.
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The authors used HTC G1 phone to collect data from
25 participants. Each participant had to perform activities
such as walking, lingering, running, up-stairs and downstairs.
The accelerometer data was sampled at 512Hz, which
decimated to 32Hz. The authors used an SVM classifier [33]
to incorporate the features along with barometric pressure.
The authors calculated the accuracy with and without using
time-embeddings in the dataset that they collected. The
approach achieved accuracy of 100% on a noisy dataset, with
average accuracy of approximately 85.48%.
12) Using Time and Frequency Domains: Thang et al.
[119] investigated how to identify the legitimate user by
using data from the accelerometer sensor. The first approach
collected data in the time domain to evaluate the similarity
score whereas the second method used the frequency domain.
Thang et al. used one device; the Google Android HTC Nexus.
The participants had to attach the device to their trouser
pockets. The sample rate was 27 Hz, linearly interpolated to
32 Hz. They divided data into windows of 8 consecutive gait
cycles. The size of window frames was invariant with 50%
overlap. Each volunteer was asked to walk as naturally as
possible for 12 walks with 36 seconds for each lap.
The authors used DTW [65] for evaluating similarity in
the time domain and used SVM [33] for classification in the
frequency domain. The accuracy achieved in the time domain
was 79.1% while the accuracy for frequency domain was
92.7%.
13) Using Wireless Acceleration Sensors: Choi et al. [120]
introduced 6 gait metrics to observe and capture patterns of
walking. The authors used sensors that measure the variance in
walking in different directions. These sensors are lightweight
wireless accelerometer sensors. The metrics are derived from
the rates of change in acceleration data. In particular, the
authors chose a sensor called Shimmer 4, which is a wearable
device with a tri-axial MMA 7361 accelerometer. The authors
asked 10 participants, 5 male and 5 female, to wear this sensor
in their back, wear tennis shoes and walk at normal speed on
a hard floor for approximately for 30 seconds. The system
applied the k-NN algorithm [52] using all six new metrics,
with normalized Euclidean distance, to find the closest match
between a test example and training examples. The approach
identified the specific user among a list of 10 test subjects.
Thus, the scheme is quite effective in extracting distinctive
gait characteristics.
Table XII summarizes current studies that use gait behavior.
E. Other Behavioral biometrics
There are several other forms of behavioral biometrics such
as voice, signature and Profiling behaviors that we have not
discussed so far. In this section, we introduce these patterns
and briefly outline the state-of-the-art for each.
4http://www.shimmer-research.com
Signature Behavior: Signature recognition can be thought
of as a behavioral biometric although the measurement
and analysis of signatures and the activities that generate
signatures are physical [121]. Efforts at signature recognition
can be categorized into two types, which are static (writing a
signature on regular paper) and dynamic (writing a signature
on a device such as tablets and smartphone). To recognize
the user, there are many features can be extracted such
as writing pressure, pen up and down directions, azimuth,
inclination and spatial X and Y coordinates at time t. Table
XIII summarizes recent published studies in this field with
respect to methodology, data collection, classifiers used and
results.
Voice Behavior: Another example of behavioral biometric
is voice that can be used to identify a user based on his/her
manner and pattern of speaking. The speaking pattern for
each person is likely to be different, based on accent,
inflectional patterns, cultural background, etc. There are two
types of features that can be used in voice biometric, which
are text-dependent (the text to be spoken for both enrollment
and authentication phases must be identical) and text-
independent (no restriction on what is spoken in enrollment
and authentication phases). Table XIV summarizes recent
published studies in this field with respect to methodology,
data collection, classifiers used and results.
Behavioral Profiling: Behavioral profiling is another
example of a behavioral biometric. It can be used to
identify an individual based on interaction with various
digital services and applications. Behavioral profiling can be
divided into two categories, network-based (monitoring users’
behavior in regards to service providers, Wi-Fi networks,
Bluetooth patterns, etc.), and host-based approach (how
the user uses different applications at different times and
different locations). There are two levels of application
profiling, which are: collecting generic application-level
information e.g., application name, date and time of usage)
and application-specific information like specific of voice
calls and text messages including phone numbers and actual
contents. Table XV summarizes recently published studies in
this field with respect to methodology, data collection, type
of classifier and results.
F. How Users View Authentication
To build authentication techniques that are going to be
actually used, it is necessary to understand users’ perspectives
on the nature and use of a proposed authentication system.
This section focuses on polls and surveys, which have been
conducted to elicit smartphone owners’ viewpoints.
1) The risk of insider attack: Muslukhov et al. [158]
found that many users worry about someone else accessing
their applications or browsing private information without
permission. They ascribed this risk to two types of intruders,
outsiders and insiders. An insider is a person who may know
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Table XII: Examples of Gait Biometrics
Study Dataset Classifier/ Distance
Metrics
Feature Set RESULT
EER FMR FNMR HTER ACCUARCY
Hestbek et. al
[99], 2012
36 DWT [65] and
SVMs [33]
Raw acceleration data, Variabil-
ity of acceleration in lateral, Ver-
tical and anterior/posterior direc-
tions, Threshold value of accelera-
tion variability, Static and dynamic
portions of gait cycles
- 9.82%, 10.45% 10.14 -
Gafurov et al.
[102], 2007
50 Manhattan [87] and
Euclidean distances
[48]
Time domain features (value be-
tween -1 and +1), Interpolation rate
32Hz
7.3% (absolute dis-
tance) & 9.3%
- - - 86.3%
Muaaz and
Mayrhofer [103],
2013
51 DTW [65] and
GDTW [104]
Three dimensional (X, Y, Z), Sam-
pling frequency 40-50 Hz
22.49% (PLA),
16.26% (NO
PLA), 33.3%
(PLA different
day) 28.21%(PLA
different day)
- - - -
Nickel et al.
[106], 2011
36 LIB-SVM [34] and
HMMs [107]
MFCC Mel-Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients [Max frequency=
10Hz], Bark-frequency Cepstral
coefficients [Max frequency=
7.5Hz,8.75Hz]
15.77% (normal),
14.39% (fast)
- - - -
Nickel et al.
[109], 2012
36 from
[106]
Euclidean distance
[48]
X-Y-Z directions, Bin Relative his-
togram distribution in linear spaced
bins between the minimum and the
maximum acceleration in the seg-
ment
8.24 - - 8.85% -
Nickel et al.
[111], 2013
48 from
[110]
HMMs [107] Interpolation rate 25, 50, and 100
samples per second, Segment of
interpolated data: 2000, 3000, and
4000 ms, Mel-frequency (MFCCs)
and Bark-Frequency Cepstral Co-
efficients (BFCCs)
7.33% (same day,
segment size 2s),
5.81% (voting
method)
- - - -
Derawi and
Bours [112],
2013
25 Bayes Net [43],
Lib-SVM [34],
Logistic Model
Trees (LMT) [113],
MLP [41], Naive
Bayes [44], RBFN
[42] & Random
Tree [46])
X-Y-Z directions, Linear time
interpolation, the average cycle
length
- - - - 99.6%(Lib-
SVM),
98.9%
(RBFN)
Mantyjarvi et al.
[114], 2005
36 - X-Y-Z axis accelerometer, Fre-
quency domain using 256 sam-
ple frame with 128 samples, 10-
bin histograms normalized by the
length of the data are composed for
x and z acceleration signals
(signal correlation)
7%, (FFT coeffi-
cients) 10%
- - - -
Derawi et al.
[115], 2010
52 DTW [65] Time Interpolation, Average cycle
length
20.1% - - - -
Frank et al.
[117], 2010
25 SVM [33] X-Y-Z axis accelerometer, Pressure
sensor, Frequency domain features
(32Hz)
- - - - 85.48%
Thang et al.
[119],2012
11 DTW [65], SVM
[33]
Multi-level wavelet decompo-
sitions, Time domain features,
Frequency domain features (32Hz)
- - - - 79.1% (time
domain),
92.7%
(frequency
domain)
Choi et al. [120],
2014
10 k-NN [52],
Euclidean distance
[48]
A) Dynamic portion of the accel-
eration data: Vertical acceleration
metric, Lateral acceleration metric,
Anterior and posterior acceleration
metric. B) Standard deviations of
the three dimensions: Vertical ac-
celeration metric, Lateral accelera-
tion metric, Anterior and posterior
acceleration metric.
- - - - -
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Table XIII: Example of Signature Behaviors on Mobile Devices
Study Idea Dataset Classifier/ Distance
Metrics
RESULT
EER FAR FRR Accuracy
Narayanaswamy
[122],1999
Signature verification based on a
specifically designed user interface
in both hardware and software.
542
authorized
and 325
impostor
HMMs [107] 3% - - -
Clarke and
Mekala [123],
2007
Tested dynamic signatures by typ-
ing common words
20 - - 0% 1.2% -
Martinez-Diaz
[124], 2008
Used dynamic features (time, speed
and acceleration, direction and ge-
ometry) with PDA and pen tablet
devices to produce a genuine sig-
nature
120 Combining PDA
features with HMM
[107]
4% - - -
Houmani et al.
[125], 2012
Evaluated several online signature
approaches in two ways: Studying
the effect of digital devices and
measuring the influence of infor-
mation content in signatures.
382 DTW [65],
Mahalanobis [49] and
Euclidean distances
[48] and HMMs
[107]
T1: 2.2%
(forgeries),
0.51% (random
forgeries).
T2: 4.97%
(skilled forg-
eries),0.55%
(random
forgeries)
- - -
Saevanee [126],
2011
A feasibility study based on writing
vocabulary words and style of SMS
messages
30 RBFN [42] 24% - - -
Blanco et al.
[127], 2012
Studied the effect of several param-
eters like screen size, operative sys-
tem and interoperability between
the devices
11 subjects
and 8 mobile
devices
DTW-based signature
recognition algorithm
[128]
Best 0.17%
(stylus), 0.29%
(fingers), Worst
3.48% (Asus )
- - -
Blanco-Gonzalo
[129], 2013
Matched with handwritten signa-
ture to recognize users on different
devices
43 DTW [128] Best 0.19%
(iPad), Worst
1.45% Intuos)
- - -
Sae-Bae [130],
2014
Developed a method based on on-
line signature by drawn with a fin-
gertip
100 from
[131], and
94 from
[132]
DTW [65], HMMs
[107]
0.35% (training
set was 20
times)
- - -
Nguyen et al.
[133], 2014
Investigated the use of online
finger-drawn PIN on a touch inter-
face
40 subjects
and 2400
imitating
samples
from two
attack (PIN
attack,
Imitating
Attack)
DTW [65] algorithm PIN: 6.7%, Im-
itation: 9.9%
- - -
Ketabdar [134],
2012
Implemented MagiSign 3D signa-
ture detector
- DTW [65] - - - -
Roshandel et al.
[135], 2012
Introduced Pingu, based on a 3D
signature using several sensors
24 J48 [39], MLP [41],
Naı¨ve Bayes [44] and
SVM [33]
- - - Sig. in the air:
SVM 99.1667%,
Sig. with table
SVM 99.4366%
the legitimate user and may have enough information about a
legitimate user’s patterns of behavior.
Muslukhov et al. provided the first empirical evidence that
smartphone users consider insider threat to be important, un-
derscoring the fact that such threats impact many smartphone
users today. The authors developed new approaches to protect
sensitive data in an unattended smartphone from unauthorized
access by any individual who poses insider threat. They also
proposed an adversarial model that describes capabilities and
goals of both outsiders and insiders. Muslukhov et al. asked
two relevant questions.
• Do users consider insiders to be a serious threat?
• Does unauthorized access by insiders occur in the real
world?
Muslukhov et al. performed two studies. The first study
interviewed 22 users, while the second study was an online
survey of 724 users. They find the following
• The majority of the users believe the insider risk is as
critical as threats from outsiders.
• More than 12% of the users have faced unauthorized
access of their data or applications on smartphones by
insiders.
more
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Table XIV: Examples of Applications of Voice Biometric
Study Idea Dataset Classifier RESULT
EER Precision Recall
Das et al. [136], 2008 Implemented Compressed Feature
Dynamics (CFD) to capture
speaker’s identity based on speech
dynamics in spoken passwords.
79 DTW [65] 0.47% - -
Miluzzo et al. [137], 2010 Implemented Darwin which is ap-
plicable to several sensing apps like
a speaker recognition that offers se-
curity for the content of conversa-
tions and raw data between phones.
8 GMM algorithm
[138]
- - -
Lu et al. [139], 2011 Proposed SpeakerSense that uses
a heterogeneous multi-processor
(HMP) to collect data via phone
calls
17 GMM [138] - 93% 85%
Kunz et al. [140], 2011 Introduced a method for continu-
ous speaker verification during an
ongoing phone call.
14 HMMs [107] 15% (segment
length 2seconds)
- -
Baloul et al. [141], 2012 Implemented a scheme to defend
against replay attacks
16 from [142] VQ (vector quanti-
zation) method [143]
based on LBG algo-
rithm [144]
0.83% - -
• More than 9% of subjects accessed smartphone without
the owner’s permission.
2) General Security Concerns and Issues with Apps:
Chin et al. [159] enumerated concerns related to smartphone
security and privacy. The authors performed interviews
with 60 participants. They also examined the reasons why
individuals do not use certain security and privacy methods.
They found that participants are concerned about privacy
on their phones more than on their laptops. As a result,
they were less likely to purchase or download apps that
perform sensitive tasks (e.g., accessing health data) on their
phones. Some of the users’ apprehensions probably stem
from misconceptions about the security of the applications, as
well as gaps in their understanding of the security of wireless
connections versus security in end-to-end wired networks. To
establish successful security indicators, the authors studied
why users may decide to download certain applications.
Users preferred to install more applications, like games
and entertainment, on mobile devices than on laptops. The
authors discovered that users found applications via browsing,
advertisements, and recommendations by friends. They were
likely to be less brand-conscious and more price-conscious
while installing applications on their mobile devices. They
also mostly ignored the applications’ terms of service and
policy agreements.
Based on their findings, Chin et al. suggested improvements
that might promote smartphone security, helping users confi-
dently harness the full potential of mobile applications.
• Education of users about the security features of various
media types is necessary. In particular, highlighting the
benefits of end-to-end encryption may go a long way in
helping to clear user misconceptions.
• Improvement of data backup, use of a lock mechanism,
and removal of wiping services that are also topics
require education.
• Implementation of new security indicators to increase
user trust in the selection of applications is also essential.
New security indicators in centralized smartphone appli-
cation marketplaces could also help smartphone users
identify trustworthy brands.
3) Importance of Security Concerns People Have: Mus-
lukhov et al. [160] presented a qualitative user study to estab-
lish requirements necessary to protect valuable information for
smartphone users. They believed that to provide security, it is
necessary to have an understanding of how users classify sen-
sitive data on smartphones. They interviewed 22 participants,
asking questions such as the following: What type of data do
users often store on their mobile phones? Where does valuable
or sensitive data come from? What types of activities do
users perform to ensure the accessibility, integrity and privacy
of their data? The study concluded that when users choose
to store sensitive data on their smartphones, they anticipate
whether or not their data might be threatened. However, users
did not consider specific details of possible risks. Users did
not try to prevent probable threats, nor they did anything to
ensure availability, confidentiality or integrity of information.
Users did not use lock systems for their devices because they
believe locking methods are ineffective. This point of view
comes from the general popularity of Internet browsers, games
and weather forecast applications, which do not require secure
authorization. The survey also showed that users think that
valuable data can be protected simply by saving information
on local storage such as external hard drives.
V. LESSONS LEARNED, OPEN PROBLEMS AND FUTURE
TRENDS
The use of continuous authentication, based on behavioral
biometrics is a promising area of study to enhance security
and usability of smartphones. Our survey has analyzed a
large number of prior studies that have used six types of
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Table XV: Example of Behavioral Profiling
Study Idea Dataset Classifier / Static
metrics
RESULT
EER FAR FPR
Hall et al. [145], 2005 Investigated the feasibility of using pro-
files at application level, which are
based on the mobility patterns using
Anomaly based Intrusion Detection
50 Instance based learn-
ing (IBL) [146]
- - 100%
Li et al. [147], 2010 Discussed the feasibility identifying
the users based on application and
network level behaviors (applications,
Bluetooth scanning, Charging device,
On/Off, SMS and voice)
94 from
[148]
Neural networks [50] Telephony
13.5%, Device
Usage:35.1% and
Bluetooth Scan
35.7%
- -
Li et al. [149], 2014 Implemented Transparent Authentica-
tion System (TAS) based on historical
application usage (location and calling
number) to verify mobile users.
76 from
[148]
RBFN [42], FF-MLP
[50] and a rule-based
approach [150]
9.8% - -
Bassu et al. [151],
2013
Designed and Implemented an active
authentication approach using mobile
usage context (app usage, location,
time, bandwidth usage and human de-
vice interaction)
- Naive Bayes model
[44]
- - -
Khan and Hengartner
[152], 2014
Introduced application-centric approach
(implement four apps: browser,
launcher, maps and comics) to collect
data and make authentication decision
instead of Device-centric approach
61 SVM [33] - 5%, 6%, 3%
& 9% for
launcher,
browser,
maps, and
comics
applications,
respectively
-
Hayashi et al. [153],
2012
Introduced an all-or-nothing access
model that uses authentication when
a sensitive application is launched by
a user. The authors investigated how
the participants can share their phones
with other in several scenarios (always
available, split and after unlock for both
tablets and phones)
14 Calculate the median
for all activities
- - -
Seifert et al. [154],
2010
Implemented TreasurePhone to using
basic functions of standard mobile
phones, such as calling, SMS, address
books, cameras usage and photo view-
ing
20 Calculated median,
Standard deviation
and the average
- - -
Shi et al. [155], 2011 Introduced a method based on user
habits to compute scores, positive or
negative. If the score is close to the
lower limit, the user is authenticated
50 Calculated probabil-
ity using Expectation
Maximization Algo-
rithm [156]
- - -
Papamartzivanos et
al. [157], 2014
Implemented a host and cloud approach
to notify the user about misbehaving
apps
- - - - -
behavioral biometric: handwaving, keystroke, touchscreen
behaviors, gait, signatures, voice and behavioral profiling.
These studies extract various features such as timestamps,
pressure, finger size, touch location and gesture type and
employ machine learning techniques. We investigate tens of
existing approaches and compare published results from them.
However, we believe that the results, in terms of accuracy
and equal error rate, can be further improved if one is able
to choose the most appropriate features and machine learning
algorithms.
In this section, we discuss lessons learned from the studies
presented in our survey, identify some problems that are
appropriate for research in the future and discuss current and
future trends.
A. Lessons Learned
Behavioral biometrics are considered promising for
providing continuous authentication for consumers. This
survey has discussed many methods that can be used to
enhance smartphone security.
Evaluation Metrics: One of the main main goals of
incorporating behavioral biometrics is to offer an easy way to
access mobile devices with few interruptions once the owner
wants to use the device. With a wide variety of proposed
approaches, there is need for a general and widely accepted
metric to compare different approaches. Currently, there is
a plethora of evaluation metrics, but none is accepted as a
standard.
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Using Machine Learning: Some studies implement
approaches using machine learning algorithms while others
do not. Machine learning algorithms are well-suited to
generalize from past user behaviors to predict the future and
as a result, are likely to be most appropriate for passive
authentication.
Balancing security and usability: One of the major goals
in continuous authentication is balancing between security
and usability to provide easy use of the device and offer high
level of security at the same time. Studies such as Gascon et
al. [62] and De Luca et al. [64], which have high value of
FPR suffer from low usability causing the device to be locked
continuously, which means the user has to validate each time
he/she wants to use the device. This action is incompatible
with the purposes of continuous authentication. Therefore,
the FPR has to be reduced to avoid this issue.
Dealing with legitimate but unusual behaviors: Many
studies such as [66] build on the assumption that a user’s
behavior is consistent and no abrupt changes happen over
a short period of time. However, this assumption may not
always be true. For example, a physical injury or a panic
situation may lead to unexpected behavioral changes, which
can lead to inconsistent reactions to the situation by the
legitimate user. Therefore, proper handling of unexpected
situations is absolute necessary.
Differentiation between legitimate user and insider attack:
Differentiating between a legitimate user and an inside
attacker is not easy, especially when someone may be able
to realistically impersonate the legitimate user,by mimicking
application usage and other behaviors of legitimate users .
B. Open Problems
In this section, we discuss potential solutions to open
problems that need to be overcome to further facilitate the use
of behavioral biometrics. This discussion occurs within the
context of smartphone security, particularly of authentication.
1) Increasing Accuracy: An open problem is that the
accuracy of current studies has to improve. We suggest that
be increased by using accuracy combination of methods. For
example, in the context of touchscreen usage, a mechanism to
gauge the authenticity may use a variety of features, such as
single-touch, multi-touch, touch movement, touch direction,
touch pressure, and touch size. Other possible useful features
may be fingertip pressure and the size and shape of the
contact area between the fingertip and the touchscreen.
2) Controlled Environment: Most current studies gather
and record data under laboratory conditions. The problem is
that the results that are obtained in a lab may not accurately
reflect what could occur in reality. Therefore, an approach to
enhancing authentication should investigate the influence of
external variables that would occur in realistic contexts (e.g.,
usage while walking or standing or in a vehicle) or other
environmental situations that frequently occur within mobile
contexts.
3) Smartphone platform: Most published methods have
been tested on the Android platform primarily because of its
popularity openness, and wide availability on smartphones
from vendors around the world. These methods have ignored
other platforms like iOS Windows Mobile and Symbian
that also have built-in sensors, such as accelerometers and
gyroscopes. Therefore, in order to insure wider availability
of consistent authentication mechanism, the investigation on
other platforms should be performed.
4) Energy consumption: Another open problem is
that most studies do not focus on the topic of resource
consumption. Researchers know that this topic should be
one of the main concerns when evaluating an approach to
authentication. During an evaluation of how resources are
used and energy is consumed, one must take certain issues
into account, such as the number of features analyzed, the
number of training profiles, the computational complexity
of the approach, and usage of CPU, memory, and battery.
These considerations must be an integral part of any viable
authentication mechanism.
5) Building Corpus: Approaches to authentication that are
based on what can be learned from machines suffer from a
lack of sufficient data that are publicly available. A reason
for this problem is that it is expensive to collect data over
a number of days, weeks, or months, especially with large
numbers of diverse subjects. Thus, the solution is to construct
a corpus that has a large amount of appropriate data and
can be used to obtain valid, interesting results. However, the
construction of such a corpus must also overcome privacy,
policy and regulatory hurdles that it is done legally and shared.
A study by Ngo et al. [161] has built a large database for
the study of sensor-based gaits, with 744 participants (355
females and 389 males) over the course of five days. In order
to be valid for use with machine learning, other types of
behavioral biometrics also require a large amount of publicly
available data.
6) Mobile Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): Detecting
intrusions should be based on computationally efficient
methods. Most investigators do not include a sufficient
number of criteria when investigating a mobile IDS. Many
aspects need to be included, such as implementing novel
decision engines and reducing power consumption. A written
checklist would help investigators remember all of the
necessary criteria.
7) Application Usage: The other problem involves not
knowing how to distinguish among users. With millions of
available apps in online markets, many users tend to use a
regular selection of the same apps every day for specific
purposes. In order to pinpoint which users are utilizing which
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apps, one needs to observe user behavior, including which
apps they access and how and where they access them.
C. Future Trends
With users accessing smartphones constantly, there is a
need to offer a continuous authentication mechanism in order
to reduce the frequency of entering PINs or drawing patterns.
Continuous authentication can be based on two of behavioral
biometrics: app usage and touch based. With widespread use
of apps (the number of mobile app downloads expected to
reach 268.69 billion in 2017 [162] that work on touchscreens
(most current devices support touchscreen), using both for
authentication sounds natural.
We believe that these types of biometrics when we are
able to extract the most useful features and a device is being
accessed can offer high level of security. Hence, the future
of authentication of smartphones is likely to incorporate
continuous authentication using app usage and touchscreen
behavior to provide a constant high level of security while
providing unfettered usability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The growing number of users of smart device is resulting
in an increasing amount of private information being stored
inside each such devices. Numerous problems in security and
privacy are constantly being raised. To resolve these issues,
researchers have implemented many methods including
continuous authentication approaches based on user behavior.
This paper has discussed and compared a number of existing
solutions from several perspectives. New methods must focus
on multiple characteristics and secure against a variety of
attacks, while making the security system easy to use and
adapted to each owner.
In addition to the methods discussed above, a promising
approach may be to measure user behavior in terms of
application usage. Each smartphone contains applications
which can be used for various purposes. Therefore, making
continuous authentication based on application usage can
be one way to enhance security and privacy. For example,
applications can be categorized into social applications
such as Twitter, Facebook and Google+; media applications
such as those related to photos, camera and video; chatting
applications such as WhatsApp, Snapchat and BBM; and
transaction applications such as bank and credit card
applications. Quantifying how, when and for how much
duration these applications are accessed by specific users
may help an implicit authentication system learn manners
of fine-grained use and differentiate between authorized
and non-authorized persons. Building a corpus for different
patterns of app usage with a large number subjects over a
number of days will be an excellent way to contribute to the
field.
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